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1. Introduction 
The United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes 
along with being a great power. 
       ---- President Bill Clinton1 
 
 The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the United States ‘security 
imperative, even when parts of the world clearly remained dangerous places. 2 As President 
William Jefferson Clinton entered the White House in January 1993, ethnic hatred, religious 
strife and the violation of human rights in the Balkans would soon demand his attention. Even 
if the United States (U.S.) stood unrivaled, indeed historically unparalleled among nations, 
evidence presented in this thesis suggests that President Clinton and his Administrations for 
years displayed hesitation, vacillation and ambivalence in addressing the conflicts and ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina3 (BiH) and Kosovo, which carried international 
ramifications and challenged America’s role in the trans-Atlantic relations. However, in the 
end President Clinton reversed years of indecision by taking successful decisive action for 
BiH and Kosovo which stopped much of the violence and ethnic cleansing.  
With this brief introduction in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze what 
significant factors finally motivated President Clinton to respond with military force after 
years of indecisiveness to the crisis in BiH and Kosovo. The study will not elaborate on how 
the U.S. forces were deployed or fulfilled their military objectives. The concerns in this study 
are neither BiH nor Kosovo, nor the rights and wrongs of particular sides of the violent 
conflicts. It aims instead to shed light on the decision-making processes by which the U.S.’ 
policies on BiH and later Kosovo were made and the calculation underlying them. The major 
focus is on Clinton’s Administrations, the corridors of power where decisions were made or 
ignored, and the pushing and pulling of Washington’s intense bureaucratic struggles. The 
detailed examination of these decision-making processes will reveal a number of factors 
which can be found in the U.S. governments’ policy processes. However, to narrow the scope, 
the questions guiding this thesis are: 
                                              
1 President Bill Clinton. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (White House: February 1995), ii. 
2  For those who assumed the ending of the Cold War would lead to a less dangerous world, the switch from inter-national to 
inter-faith hostilities boded ill 
3 The official local name of the country is Bosne i Herzegovine or the acronym “BiH.” In English the name is “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”. However, many authors use “Bosnia” others use “Bosnia-Herzegovina.” In this study the author uses BiH. 
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What factors motivated President Clinton to respond militarily4 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1995 and Serbia in 1999? 
While these two questions have the appearance of being rather straightforward, the 
range of possible departures to approach them is broad. A multitude of theoretical tools are 
available to bring to bear on the given questions. Even if both realist and liberalist approaches 
to international order were evident in the major post-Cold War debates, a different approach 
will guide this thesis. Roger Hilsman’s Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense 
Policy-Making5 seems among the most relevant and helpful; first, because it falls under the 
rubric of decision-making models and second, because it opens up a multifactor analysis of 
the Clinton Administrations’ decision-making processes in foreign policy and defense issues. 
Further, Hilsman’s model challenges the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize a nation 
as a unitary rational actor, because individuals, groups and organizations acting in the name of 
the nation are sensitive to different types of domestic and international pressures. In this 
research, Hilsman’s model with some tailored modifications is adopted as the guiding 
methodological approach. As a point of departure it is helpful to mention that the outcome of 
the two political-military cases explored are products of President Clinton’s decision-making 
processes in which five actors, or power centers, to various degrees played dominating roles: 
(1) the President of the United States; (2) the President’s advisors and the bureaucrats in the 
Departments of State and Defense; (3) Congress; (4) the electoral politics; and (5) the 
President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević. Slobodan Milosević turned out to have been far 
more influential than initially thought.  
Structure of this thesis 
This story of the making of U.S. policies in BiH and Kosovo is told in five chapters. 
The first chapter begins with a brief presentation of methodological and theoretical 
perspectives considered in this thesis; secondly it presents a closer account of Roger 
Hilsman’s Political Process Model - the methodology chosen for this study and; third, 
                                              
4 The terms militarily or use of force are used to describe and analyze specific action or involvement by third parties. These 
two phrases are necessarily broad and encompass a host of possibilities. See Andrea Talentino, Military Intervention after the 
Cold war (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 52-54; Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The use of American military Force in 
the Post Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1999), 50; and Karin Von Hippel, Democracy by Force: 
U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3. 
5 Roger Hilsman with his co-writers; Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, present this conceptual model in the book: 
Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics (Eaglewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1993). Hereafter, Hilsman is referred to as the author.  
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arguments will be presented why Hilsman’s political process model is adopted over other 
possible methodical approaches.  
Chapter Two reviews the contextual framework of contemporary debates that shaped 
the legacy confronting the incoming Clinton Administration on political-military issues in 
1993. First, this chapter briefly discusses issues evolving from the Vietnam War legacy; the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrines and the two dominant schools of thoughts for use of U.S. 
forces. Secondly, the contemporary debate over sovereignty and humanitarian intervention is 
briefly introduced, followed by lessons identified from the U.S. post-Cold War interventions 
in Iraq (1990-91) and Somalia (1992-93). Third, an overview of the breakup of the former 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and how that crisis escalated internecine war in BiH and the 
escalating conflict in Kosovo will be presented. Forth, the George H. Bush Administration’s 
responses to the crises in the Balkans are presented before a summary concludes this chapter. 
Chapters Three and Four turn to the case studies from BiH and Kosovo respectively. 
These chapters examine the influence of the five power centers over the Clinton 
Administrations’ handling of the crises in BiH and Kosovo. Each chapter ends with a 
summary presenting the chapters’ conclusions.  
In the fifth and concluding chapter, conclusions will be drawn on which factors 
significantly motivated President Clinton to intervene in the Balkans twice.  
Sources 
The sources used in this thesis are a mix of primary and secondary materials: public and 
government documents, speeches, remarks, congressional testimonies, biographies, memoirs, 
and academic articles and books. The analysis places a special emphasis on public documents, 
speeches and statements made by senior officials before and during the review process. 
Maintaining a healthy distance from the memoirs of the key players is a necessity. Few 
governmental officials are eager to downplay their role in solving international crisis or to 
highlight their own mistakes. Officials may seek to rationalize their decisions by advocating 
that the imperatives of foreign affairs left them no choice; or they may take credit for making 
a choice where none really existed. Despite these warnings, the memoirs of President George 
H. Bush, President Bill Clinton, Secretary Madeleine Albright, Secretary Warren Christopher, 
General Colin Powell and General Wesley Clark have been of importance in understanding 
their roles and justification for their actions in these political-military endeavors. Their 
memoirs have been weighed against other sources.  
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Secondary sources and analyses of the conflicts in the Balkans are numerous and they 
have provided a natural point of departure for this study. David Halberstam’s book War in a 
Time of Peace provided valuable contributions on both BiH and Kosovo because his book 
provides great insight into the struggles for dominance among the key actors in the Clinton 
Administrations. Ivo H. Daalder’s great knowledge from his service in the U.S. National 
Security Council (NSC) as Director for European Affairs (1995-1996) are well-presented in 
his two books; 6 Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy and Winning 
Ugly: NATO’s War to save Kosovo. Bob Woodward presents in his two books:7 The Agenda 
and The Choice how President Clinton and his advisors grappled with some of the major 
questions in Clinton’s first term. Richard Holbrooke’s book To End a War is a well written 
memoir to understand the intricacies of how American actions were decisive in bringing and 
end to the tragedy in BiH.8 Dusko Doder and Louise Branson have written a chilling portrait 
of Slobodan Milosević, the croupier of the modern games of the Balkans in their book 
Milosević portrait of a Tyrant.9 Armed with years of experience as a diplomat and analyst of 
the Balkans, Louis Sell has written the biography Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of 
Yugoslavia that merits attention from anyone who wants to understand the nature of Slobodan 
Milosević.10   
On the other hand, several documents which could have provided even deeper insight 
into the internal processes leading up to President Clinton’s final decisions remain classified 
by the U.S. Government. This lack of access to such documents might reduce the insight and 
precision of some parts of this thesis. It has been almost impossible to find documents that 
could provide extensive knowledge about Slobodan Milosević’s intentions and plans. 
Milosević was the type of politician who left no traces. He never wrote articles under his 
name and his short speeches contained no plans. He never held a press conference. However, 
based on the extensive number of different sources used, the author is quite confident that the 
following accounts are well-grounded, accurate, and hopefully - convincing. 
                                              
6 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton. The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2000) and Ivo H. Daalder with Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly. NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, (Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 
7 Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1995, 2005 
edition) and Bob Woodward, The Choice: How Clinton won (New York: Touchstone, 1996). 
8 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1999). 
9 Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Milosević: Portrait of a tyrant (New York: The Free Press, 1999). 
10 Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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1.1 Identifying factors of explanation: Theoretical and methodical 
considerations 
The purposes of this subchapter are first to give a brief presentation of different 
theoretical perspectives considered as possible points of departure in this thesis: Second, to 
give a more detailed account of the chosen methodology, Roger Hilsman’s Political Process 
Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking and how this model is tailored to fit the 
conditions of this study; and third, argue why Hilsman’s model was adopted over other 
possible methodical approaches.  
The foreign policy of the U.S., in the post Cold War era, covers so much history and so 
many events that it is capable of sustaining many interpretations, even contradictory ones. The 
subject is supplied with an overabundance of possible theoretical approaches. The author has 
been confronted with divergent approaches to President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy in the 
Balkans. Part of the challenge has been to clarify and compare alternative explanations of the 
Clinton Administrations’ policies. Such explanations can be found, among other places, in the 
decisions of the President, in the policies of the U.S. government, and in patterns of the 
political-military history of the U.S. Beginning with the basics; the separation of powers 
between the President and Congress is a central feature of American democracy. It is widely 
accepted that the President is the single most influential actor in determining U.S. foreign 
policy and as the Commander in Chief, at the centre of any decision to deploy military forces 
abroad.11 However, even though the President is paramount in foreign affairs, coalitions of 
other power centers sometimes defeat him. An example of this is the Presidential War Powers 
Act of 1973.12   
In practice, presidential political-military decisions, when committing U.S. forces 
abroad, are normally based on comprehensive political processes within the Administration.  
According to Roger Hilsman, characteristics of such governmental political processes are: (1) 
disagreements, struggle or conflicts not only about objectives and values, but also the 
available means for achieving them; (2) presence of competing actors with alternative 
                                              
11 The Constitution of the United States, Article II and section 2: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States.” 
12 For decades Presidents and Congress feuded over the wording of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, which reserved 
to Congress rather than the President the power to declare war. The War Powers Act of 1973 is a federal law providing that 
the President can send  armed forces abroad only by authorization of Congress or if the U.S. is already under attack or serious 
threat. Source: The War Powers Act - the joint resolution 93rd Congress H.J. Resolution, November 7, 1973. Available at: 
http://www.thecre.com/fedlaw/legal22/warpow.htm  accessed March 11, 2009.  
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objectives or policies; (3) along with disagreements and struggles there is simultaneously and 
paradoxically a strain toward agreement; and (4) struggle for power is involved.13  
Selected Concepts of International order 
The foreign and defense policies of the U.S. are based on American cultural values. It is 
commonly accepted that no single theory of international relations provides a complete 
account of the true answers. As an example, Madeleine Albright advocated the following in 
her memoirs:  
The first is that I hoped never again to hear foreign policy described as a debate 
between Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical realists. In the last part of the last 
millennium no President or Secretary of State could manage events without 
combining the two.14  
However, the issues discussed in this thesis are dependent in large part on views of 
international relations or foreign policy in the post Cold War era which depends on different 
theoretical perspectives. The brief introduction presented here cannot do justice to the entire 
range of theoretical perspectives found in current literature. Among the approaches considered 
were realism and liberalism, which in American diplomatic history is revealed as the most 
influential explanatory structural theories of international relations.  Robert S. Litwak has 
argued that competing realist and liberal approaches were evident in the major foreign policy 
debates and swings of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.15 The realist-
liberal cleavage framed the post Cold War debate on the crucial issues of humanitarian 
intervention to prevent ethnic conflicts within states.16  
On the other hand, several literatures probe the theories of foreign policy decision-
making.  One group focuses on the manner in which government bureaucracy shapes the 
outcomes of policy. Graham A. Allison’s bureaucratic-organizational perspectives in Essence 
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis17 is one such example considered in this 
                                              
13 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, 78-82.  
14 Quoted in Madeleine, Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary: A memoir (New York: Pan Books, 2003), 505. 
15 Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Security through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2007), 20. 
16 See Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches (2. ed). New 
York: Oxford University, 2003), 67-138; Ole R Holsti,”Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy,” 1989; M 
Mastandunu, D.A.Lake and G J Ikeberry “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” 1989; Jervis, R “Realism, 
“Neoliberalsim and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” 1999; and Talentino, Military Intervention After the Cold War, 
4-8. 
17 See Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Phillip. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2ed. (Charlottesville: 
Longman, 1999). This is an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison used the crisis as a case study for governmental 
decision-making.  The book was originally published by Allison in 1971. In 1999, he published the second edition with Philip 
Zelikow. 
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thesis. Decision-making models challenge the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize a 
nation as a unitary, rational actor because individuals, groups and organizations acting in the 
name of the nation are sensitive to different types of domestic pressures.18 Answering this 
thesis’ questions, the prime interests are theories that explain the political-military issues 
during Clinton’s presidency in terms of the reasons, beliefs, and processes by which the actors 
or power-centers made their choices. Subsequently, this thesis will be guided by Roger 
Hilsman’s Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking, which falls under 
the rubric of decision-making models.   
The Political Process Model of Foreign and Defense Policymaking 
Roger Hilsman advocated his political process model allows a more comprehensive 
examination of the evolution of foreign policy, compared with most other methodical 
approaches. His approach allows a range of actors, or power centers to be considered. For 
Hilsman, in the broadest sense, there are nine power centers, involved  in U.S. foreign 
policymaking processes: (1) the President; (2) the President’s staff and advisors; (3) the 
political appointees; (4) Congress; (5) the bureaucrats; (6) interest groups; (7) the media; (8) 
public opinion; and (9) the electorate.19  
This list of power centers is presented in the form of three concentric – rings of power.20 
Each ring denotes a difference in the degree of power or influence upon decision-making, with 
the inner most ring being those that are most powerful. Hilsman’s model operates on the 
assumption that the procedures for internal decision making are of great importance to 
understand the foreign policy of states. Consequently, Hilsman underlines that a variety of 
actors are involved in the making of government decisions. Those most directly involved hold 
government office: the President of the United States, members of Congress and bureaucrats in 
the Departments of State and Defense. Others actively trying to influence policy decisions do 
not hold offices; interest groups, the media, academia and the electorate. Some have more 
power than others and the power of each varies with the subject matter. Each power center has 
its own motives and goals. Most power centers presumably share the state goals of preserving 
the sovereignty, prosperity, defense, democracy prestige, and global influence of the U.S. 
                                              
18 Holsti,, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy,” 47-48 
19 Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, Chapters 9-17. 
20 The inner ring is made up of the power centers: The President, the Presidents staff and advisors, the political appointees, 
Congress and the bureaucrats, which comprise government officials. Ring number 2 holds the power centers; interest groups 
and the media. The outer ring is the power centers; public opinion and the electorate. 
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However, even though a majority of power centers share a commitment to state goals, they also 
have other goals. In addition, each power center might have a different view about how to 
achieve a particular goal. Hilsman advocated that policy disagreements are more frequently 
over means rather than goals.21  Because power centers differ in their goals, each of them 
attempt to build coalitions among like-minded as they persuade, bargain, logroll, manipulate, 
outmaneuver or even use power to achieve their goals. At the same time as the various power 
centers maneuver in their political wheeling and dealing there is, according to Hilsman, a 
“strain toward agreement.”   
However, Hilsman does not envision foreign actors as possible power centers in his 
Political Process Model. This is a weakness in Hilsman’s model. Subsequently, this author 
had two choices; either he fully accepted Hilsmans sole domestic approach or developed 
another approach that even better fit the conditions of this thesis. Evidence found among 
sources used, suggested that actions of external actors probably influenced President Clinton’s 
decision-making processes in the cases examined. Consequently, this author decided to 
consider the influence major international organizations and selected political leaders in the 
Balkans and Moscow had on the Clinton Administrations’ decision-making processes.   
The power centers of this analysis 
In this section of the chapter, the more general organization of the Political Process Model put 
forth by Hilsman will be tailored to better fit the special conditions of this study. Based on 
available sources and Hilsman’s descriptions of the selected methodical approach, two of the 
power centers are obvious; the President and Congress. First, in the U.S. political system, 
with its separation of powers, foreign policy is the area in which presidents have the greatest 
personal discretion. The President is granted this key power centre because he is the single 
most influential actor in determining U.S. foreign policy, as specified in the Constitution of 
the United States. Secondly, Although Congress is obviously a power centre as the body of 
purse and legislation, the exact nature of its power in foreign affairs and defense is elusive. 
However, Congress acting as unit on foreign policy issues is a power centre. Evidence 
suggests this became an issue when the Republicans held the majority in both the House and 
Senate after the 1994 mid-term elections. In discussing Congress’ impact on foreign policy, 
the 1973 War Powers Act, Defense budget, and the annual Foreign Assistance Act that funds 
                                              
21 Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs, 87.   
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foreign aid programs have to be considered. Due to obvious reasons mentioned here, Congress 
is incorporated as a power centre in this study as the model envisions.  
Regarding the additional seven introduced power centers in Hilsman’s model their 
relevance has been researched and considered to fit the conditions of this study. Based on this 
research the following approach was chosen:  First, separation of Hilsman’s three power 
centers; the President’s staff, his advisors, and his political appointees and bureaucrats seemed 
unworkable. In the Clinton Administrations they seemed not to have been divided the way 
Hilsman envisioned them in his model. Subsequently, Hilsman’s division seemed 
unnecessary. Without inside access to the White House or Departments’ classified documents 
it seemed almost impossible to differentiate between the positions of these three power 
centers. For this reason, this study does not divide the department secretaries, who have been 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate and for other staff members/advisors where such a confirmation 
is not needed. Given the lack of clear distinction between these three power centers, it seems 
most sensible, in this study to focus on the role of the Presidential Staff and advisors. Included 
in this power centre are the NSC22 and the two most predominant bureaucracies in U.S. 
foreign policymaking: the Department of State and the Department of Defense. These two 
departments and the NSC were clearly involved in the policy formulations that led to the 
interventions in the Balkans. However, evidence presented, in Chapters 3 and 4, suggests that 
these two departments disagreed on several occasions over goals and the means to respond to 
the crises in the Balkans. Other bureaucracies such as the Departments of Justice and Treasury 
are not considered power centers in this study due to the limited evidence that they influenced 
the decision-making processes in the Balkans.   
 Second, in addition to the evolving international environment, a change of recent years 
has been the increase in number of interest groups trying to influence U.S. foreign policy. 
Interest groups influence has been affected by the spread of ideas and networking power that 
are part of globalization. However, interest groups seemed to play a much less important role 
in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Evidence in this study’s literature supports this 
                                              
22 President Clinton approved in Presidential Decision Directive 2 on January 21, 1993 a National Security Council (NSC) 
decision-making system that enlarged the numbers of members of the NSC and included a greater emphasis on economic 
issues in the formulation of national security policy. The President, Vice President, and Secretaries of State and Defense were 
members of the NSC as prescribed by statute. The Director of CIA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory 
advisers to the NSC, attended its meetings. The new members of the NSC included: the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. 
Representative to the UN, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for 
Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President. Heads of other executive departments and agencies, the special 
statutory advisers to the NSC, and other senior officials would be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where needed.  
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view: (1) There were no large organized ex patriot/immigrant constituent interest groups from 
the former Yugoslavia in the U.S. and (2) no economically important multi-national U.S. 
corporations with large investments in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the impact of interest 
groups as power centers is not emphasized in this study. 
 Third, the impact of the media has been considered. Media is an increasingly powerful 
foreign policy actor. Television, in particular has the ability to forward a policy agenda 
through the impact of its images. However, even if media on several occasions probably had 
impact on the executive, the public opinion and Congress by presenting images of the dead, 
artillery shelling, refugees and concentration camps in BiH and later from the violence in 
Kosovo, the media seem not to have been a power centre in their own right. After some 
consideration, the role of the media in the policy processes leading to the interventions in BiH 
and Kosovo do not warrant the title as a power centre, but rather should be categorized as a 
variable influencing the positions of the acknowledged power centers by supplying images 
and stories linked to the situation on the national agenda. 
   Fourth, Hillman’s separation of public opinion and the electorate seems challenging 
in discussing military interventions. On the one hand, Clinton in his presidency placed a great 
deal of emphasis on the results of polls. On the other hand, the voice of the electorate in the 
mid-term election of 1994 and the presidential election in 1996 had great influence on 
Clinton’s approach to the crisis in BiH. Hilsman noted that the concept referred to as public 
opinion is not a power centre in the same sense as the other examined previously. Even if 
Clinton’s focus and drive for re-election as President might outweigh the influence of public 
opinion in this context, the author decided to establish a power center called the electoral 
politics which contain elements from both the electorate and public opinion.  
 Fifth, the views from Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Moscow should also be 
considered as a power center based on their influence on the break up of Yugoslavia, the wars 
that followed and the Clinton Administrations’ policy processes toward the Balkans. The 
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosević23 became a key player 
and a power center in the conflicts in BiH and Kosovo. When Yugoslavia broke up, Slobodan 
                                              
23 Slobodan Milošević was President of Serbia from 1989 until 1997 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) from 1997-2000. FRY consisted of the Republics Serbia and Montenegro and had little in common with pre 1991 
Yugoslavia.  Milosević’s political course was set after he uttered the words “None will ever dare beat you again” at a dispute 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo on April 24, 1987. It was exactly what the crowd wanted to hear 
(see Doder and Branson, Milosević, 3, 43). Serb nationalists regarded Milosević as the leader of all Serbs in the Balkans 
when he became President of Serbia.  
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Milosević had different choices. First, he could accepted the dissolution of the Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia into new independent republics based on the will of their population. 
Secondly, he could have ordered the Yugoslavian Army to not interfere. Third, he could have 
acceded to the demands from the United Nations (UN), the European Community (EC) and 
the U.S. and promptly withdrawn his forces from BiH and later Kosovo. If he had done so, 
BiH would probably have been spared from enourmous civilian and military casualities. 
Finally, he could have acceded to the international community's demand of stopping atrocities 
in Kosovo and avoided the bombing of Belgrade. Evidence suggests that the leadership of 
Bosnian Serbs in Pale were a part of Milosević's power center, because they wanted to be a 
part of Serbia. Other possible power centers were considered and rejected. The President of 
Croatia  Franjo Tudjman has also been considered as a possible power center. 24 His political 
platform was the destruction of Yugoslavia, indpendence for Croatia and hatred of the Serbs. 
Even if Tudjman to a certain degree influenced the situation in BiH, he had no influence over 
Kosovo. When the U.S. became increasingly sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslims, Tudjman 
switched his strategy on BiH from partition to one of using Croatia's geographic proximity to 
dominate the part of BiH not held by the Bosnian Serbs. Louis Sell argued that Tudjman had 
little interest in the details of the settlement in BiH. 25 Consequently, Tjudman has been 
rejected as a power center as envisioned by Hilsman. Alija Izetbegović,26 the first President of 
BiH was also considered as power center. He as the leading Bosnian Muslim politician had 
the most ambitious political objectives seeking to preserve BiH as an unitary state. However 
the Muslims were the qweakest party in BiH militarily. Subsequently, Izetbegović was a 
player, but the internal disagreemts among the Bosnian Muslims senior leaders downplayed 
his role and influence to a degree that he should not be regarded as a power center as 
                                              
24 Franjo Tudjman was the first President of Croatia in the 1990s. Tudjman's nationalist political party, the Croatian 
Democratic Union won the first post Communist party elections in 1990 and he became the president of Croatia. Tudjman 
came to power in the first free elections in 1990, riding a wave of Croatioan nationalism. Tudjman was a former general in 
the Yugoslav Army. He channeled the emotions of Croat nationalism onto himself and used them without scruples to 
establish his political power. Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats during the Dayton negotiations in November 1995. He 
was reelected twice and remained in power until his death in 1999. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 236; and Doder and 
Branson, Milosević, 81-82.  
25 See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 252. 
26 Alija Izetbegović became the first President of BiH in 1992. He served in this role until 1996, when he became a member 
of the Presidency of BiH, serving until 2000. Izetbegović promoted the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnia under central control, 
which in the circumstances seemed a hopeless strategy.  Izetbegovic must bear some of the responsibility for the conflict in 
BiH by championing Muslim nationalism without having any strategy for handling its disastrous impact in multiethnic BiH 
In 1993, he agreed to a peace plan that would divide Bosnia along ethnic lines but continued to insist on a unitary Bosnia 
government from Sarajevo and on the allocation to the Bosnian Muslims of a large percentage of BiH's territory. During the 
Dayton negotiations the Muslim delegation seemed to lack dynamics and in the end it was Izetbegović who caused the major 
challenges to get a final settlement.  Sources: Holbrooke, To End a War, 285; and Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the 
destruction of Yugoslavia, 5. 
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envisioned.27 Consequently, Izetbegović is rejected as a power center. Russia was arguably a 
peripheral power center in the Kosovo crisis, but not BiH.28 Russia is, however, not 
considered a power centers in this study due to the limited evidence that they had leverage to 
influence the decision-making processes in the Balkans.   
  Sixth, the UN and NATO have also been considered as power centers. It is obvious 
that the UN had a key role in decision-making processes in BiH and NATO had a dominant 
role in the intervention over Kosovo. Both organizations were strong influences on the 
decisions and decision-makers, only neither was a power center for both interventions. 
Consequently, the UN and NATO are rejected as power centers. 
 Consequently, five power centers are acknowledged in this study: (1) the President of 
the United States (2) the U.S. President’s advisors included the Departments of State and 
Defense; (3) Congress; (4) U.S. electoral politics; and (5) the President of Serbia, Slobodan 
Milosević.   
 
Why Roger Hilman’s Political Process Model?  
The selection of Roger Hilsman’s Political Process Model as the theoretical approach 
for this thesis should raise two questions: (1) why is a decision-making theory chosen over 
other approaches, such as a liberalism or realism? And (2), of several available decision-
making models, why choose Hilsman’s political process model? 
 In his inaugural address, President Clinton used the expected presidential phrase that 
the U.S. would use military means when “our vital interests are challenged.29 If this was the 
sole approach for the use of military force then any effort to explain why the Clinton 
Administrations intervened military in the Balkans would be grounded in one of the 
traditional schools of international relations scholarship. By drawing on the works of Hans 
Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and George Kennan, the frame for explanation of U.S. military 
interventions in BiH and Kosovo would be in terms of interests, power and the U.S.’ 
prerogative in an anarchic system. If observers, concluding that the U.S. became involved in 
the Balkans because U.S. national interests were at stake, and that it was such calculations that 
led to the Clinton policies are fully correct, then any effort to explain its responses should be 
                                              
27 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 154-155, 182, 279, 285, 303 and 308-309. 
28 The Russian potential veto in the UNSC and the Russian withdrawal of support for Milosević in June 1999 precipitated his 
capitulation.  
29 President Bill Clinton, “Inaugural Address”,  20 January 1993 
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grounded in realism. However, Clinton also added in his inaugural address the phrase “…or 
the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful 
diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary.”30  By this statement, President 
Clinton seemingly committed the U.S. to act on behalf of collective humanitarian values of 
the international community. If this were the true case, then efforts to explain why the Clinton 
Administrations responded with military means in the Balkans would be grounded in the 
traditional school of liberalism. Consequently, based on Clinton’s inaugural address in 
January 1993 a realism or liberalism approach would, to a certain degree, have been useful 
methodologies in this research.  
However, after some investigation it became evident that these two approaches would 
not be fully appropriate for two reasons: First, keeping in mind that the crises in the Balkans 
were at Clinton’s desk for years before he reached his conclusions, shows that an attempt to 
understand the forming of his policies in terms of a unitary state actor would at best uncover 
only half of the dilemmas Clinton was facing. The Clinton Administration’s numerous 
consultations with other government bodies and allied nations give an assumption that the 
internal decision-making processes that took place are important in better understanding the 
U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. One of the central canons of realism is treating states as the 
only actors on the world stage and as unitary decisions-makers. This minor interest in the 
internal dynamics of decision-making, because realists assume that inputs to such processes are 
generally uniform from case to case, would probably not meet the ambitions of this thesis. 
Secondly, evidence suggests that Clinton’s initial focus on “assertive multilateralism” which 
could support a liberalism approach for this thesis more or less diminished during his first year 
in office. The challenges Clinton faced in Somalia in 1993 can explain why he signed 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which signaled a reformed policy on multilateral 
peace operations, a more or less complete reversal of what he had promised during his 
campaign.31 PDD-25 seemed to represent the Clinton Administration's formal abandoning of 
assertive multilateralism and the previous intention to increase the U.S. participation in 
multilateral peace operations which can be envisioned by liberalism.32  
                                              
30 Ibid.   
31 The PDD-25 endorsed UN peacekeeping as an option measured by U.S. interests, while establishing criteria to make it 
more successful in operations and supportable at home.  
32 Robert C. DiPrzio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore Maryland: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 25. 
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 Hilsman’s Political Process Model does not fall within the bounds of the schools of 
realism or liberalism. His model operates on the assumptions that the internal decision-
making processes are of great importance for understanding the foreign policy of states. 
Democratically run states, like the U.S., are not unitary actors but comprise several 
components which operate within the political-military specter, and others which influence 
the processes from without. Under the rubric of decision-making models, the Hilsman 
approach was not the only model considered. Graham T. Allison’s approach in Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missiles Crises was also considered, but rejected because; 
(1) an assumption that Clinton’s military interventions could be the results of just 
bureaucratic politics seemed too simplistic; and (2) the author wanted to test the potential of 
Hilsman’s model. Subsequently, Hilsman’s model is chosen because it seems to be a more 
flexible and comprehensive political decision-making process model in meeting the 
conditions of this study, than the other methodical approaches considered. Where no one 
single actor appeared to dominate the decision-making process for U.S. foreign policy 
regarding the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Hilsman model best describes the competing 
power centers and their varying influence on that policy and the decisions made. 
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2. Context: The President’s Balkan policy 
Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new 
responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom…Our hopes, our hearts 
and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and 
freedom. Their cause is America’s cause. 
             --- President Bill Clinton.33   
 
The Presidents of the U.S. do not inherit clean slates. Like his predecessors, this was 
true for President Clinton. Consequently, an analysis of what factors motivated President 
Clinton to respond with two military interventions in the Balkans would not be complete 
without a discussion of the evolution of major political-military issues that had significantly 
shaped the American approach to foreign policy and military interventions up to the mid-
1990s. A natural starting point for such an analysis, even though evidence suggests it started 
earlier, is the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.34 The notion, known as the “Vietnam syndrome,” 
discouraged presidents of the U.S. from intervening abroad for many years and hence it has 
significantly influenced U.S.’ foreign policy since 1975.35  
Contemporary debate in the U.S. over military intervention was influenced by a number 
of prominent public figures; Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, George H. Bush, and Les 
Aspin. They all expressed views on the questions when and how to use (or not use) military 
force. Their positions will be introduced in this chapter. Later on, Bill Clinton, Warren 
Christopher, Madeleine Albright, William Perry and William Cohen would express their 
views on the same issues during their governmental service.    
                                              
33 President Bill Clinton, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, D.C. January 20, 1993.  
34 For decades, Vietnam left indelible impressions on the minds of political leaders, members of Congress, the bureaucracies, 
military personnel, the academic world and the media. 
35 Vietnam Syndrome refers to both a collective and an individual ailment stemming from America's long involvement in the 
Vietnam War (1957-1975). On the collective level, Vietnam syndrome describes America's general reluctance to use military 
force abroad because of the psychological trauma caused by different aspects of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam syndrome 
resulted in a political, military, and civilian body unwilling to risk military engagement for fear of "another Vietnam." The 
syndrome meshed into American foreign and military policy from Richard M. Nixon's presidency to Bill Clinton's. The term 
Vietnam Syndrome was apparently first coined by Ronald Reagan during his presidential election campaign in 1980, in a 
speech to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Sources:  U.S. History Encyclopaedia 
(www.answers.com/topic/Vitenam-syndrome) accessed March 18, 2009.  
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2.1 The Weinberger - Powell Doctrines 
During the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, the most influential 
view on military intervention was the Weinberger Doctrine. This doctrine, rooted in the 
experience of Vietnam and the truck-driven suicide bomb that killed 241 U.S. servicemen in 
Beirut in Lebanon on October 23, 1983 was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Casper 
Weinberger. Weinberger presented six major tests for guiding when and how the U.S. should 
commit combat troops in the future: 36 
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless vital national interests of 
the U.S. or its allies are at stake 
2. If it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so 
wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise troops should not 
be committed 
3. Political and military objectives must be clearly defined and U.S. combat troops must 
have the capacity to accomplish those objectives 
4. Objectives, force structures and dispositions must be continually reassessed and 
adjusted as events on the ground dictate 
5. There must be “some reasonable assurance” of support from the people and Congress 
6. Commitment of U.S. forces should be considered only as a last resort.37 
 
The guidelines of the Weinberger Doctrine were received quite differently in the Department 
of State and Department of Defense. On the one hand, it was embraced in Pentagon circles; 
but on the other hand, the Secretary of State Georg Shultz was “…worried that American 
diplomacy, not backed up by credible threats of force, would be hamstrung by the military's 
supposed reluctance to become involved in limited wars.”38 In 1992, following the decisive 
victory of U.S. and allied forces in the first Gulf War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, reiterated in his article U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, 
the main themes of the Weinberger Doctrine, by advocating:  
When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when 
the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined 
with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives 
must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with 
the political objectives.39  
                                              
36 Casper Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power”, at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., November 28, 1984. 
37 For a more comprehensive outline see Weinberger’s speech in Haass, Intervention, (1999), 197-205. 
38 See Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, “The Use of Military Force,” PBS/Frontline Report, 1999. Available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/ accessed, February 27, 2009. See also Colin Powell with 
Joseph Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine books, 2003), 303.   
39 Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5 (winter 1992-93), 38. 
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General Powell advocated that the strategy for use of force should move from focusing on 
global war-fighting to a focus on regional contingencies.40 Powell explained that two schools 
of thought were dominant in the U.S. debate over the use of military force: (1) the limited war 
school and (2) the all-out war school.41 Powell warned that the use of force should be 
restricted to occasions where it can do some good by arguing: 
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular 
crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or limited attack. When the “surgery” is 
over and the desired results are not obtained, a new set of experts then comes 
forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, 
more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war- making.42   
Powell followed up in his memoirs where he endorsed Weinberger’s six guidelines: 
Clausewitz would have applauded. And in the future, when it became my 
responsibility to advise Presidents on committing our forces to combat, 
Weinberger rules turned out to be a practical guide.43 
General Colin Powell’s influence on how U.S. forces were successfully used in the Gulf War 
of 1991 adhering to the Weinberger Doctrine led commentators to begin using the term 
“Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.” Robert DiPrizo argued that those sympathetic to the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine would interpret “clear objectives” to mean an “exit strategy.”44  
In September 1992, the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Les 
Aspin45 presented his thoughts regarding use of force: 46 
1. Force should only be used as a last resort 
2. Military force should only be used when there is a clear-cut military objective 
3. Military forces should be used only when we can measure that the military 
objective can be achieved. We need to know when we can bring the troops back 
home 
4. Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion. 
 
Aspin argued further that a large group of officers who were veterans of the Vietnam War, 
associated with General Powell, were strong believers in an “all-or nothing” school. Aspin 
also elaborated on views that were linked to “a limited objective school.” The latter school 
                                              
40 Ibid, 32-45. 
41 Ibid, 36-38. Powell argued that all wars are limited by three means: by the territory on which they are fought; by the means 
used to fight them; or by the objectives for which they are fought. 
42 Ibid, 40. 
43 Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House Ballantine Publishing Group, 
1995), 303. 
44 DiPrzio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo,  3. 
45 Les Aspin later became Secretary of Defence in the first year of the Clinton Administration.  
46 Les Aspin: Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington D.C., September 21, 1992. Source: 
Excerpts of the address in Haass, Intervention, (1999), Appendix D 
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wanted the kind of results that often requires military action or at least the credible threat of 
military action. Aspin presented Iraq and BiH as examples. Aspin’s assessment was that the 
“all-or-nothing” school was weakened when the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the risk 
of escalation that had accompanied any limited military venture.47  In many ways, Aspin’s 
thoughts were a continuation of more than four decades-long U.S. foreign policy debate of 
protecting and advancing U.S. interests versus a perceived moral responsibility to use military 
capabilities to assist people less fortunate. Richard Haass argued that a number of defense 
thinkers, notably Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling and Robert Osgood developed literature 
devoted to limited war.48  
In a speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point in the waning days of 
his presidency, George H. Bush articulated his views on military interventions. Bush argued 
for a case-by-case approach in deciding when and where to use military force.  He set out five 
requirements necessary for military intervention to make sense: 49 
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where 
and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to be 
effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the 
potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice. 
This address by President Bush marked a major departure from the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine because he advocated it was impossible to apply rigid criteria to deciding whether or 
not to use military force in a given situation. Subsequently, Bush modified the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine with the need to seek and obtain international consensus and multilateral 
operations.  
2.2 Sovereignty and humanitarian norms 
 Sovereignty and non-intervention form the basis of order in the modern international 
state system and serve to protect weaker states from stronger ones.50 The tenet of the modern 
                                                                                                                                             
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Haass, Intervention: The use of American military Force in the Post Cold War World, 11-13. The premise of this 
discussion was that during the Cold War, with its inherent danger of escalation to nuclear exchanges, the U.S. did not have 
the luxury to follow the optimal overwhelming force approach.  Consequently, it was argued that the U.S. needed to develop 
doctrines and forces that would enable limited uses of conventional forces. Military forces thus became instruments of 
communication as much as destruction.  
49 President George H. Bush, address at West Point, New York., 5 January 1993: See Haass, Intervention,, Appendix F, 223-
228  
50 Philosophers and scholars have for hundreds of years debated the subject of sovereignty and military intervention. 
Immanuel Kant argued in Perpetual Peace in 1795 that the concept of a world republic was unrealistic, suggesting instead an 
ever-expanding union of nations aimed at preventing war. Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: 
Interventionism after Kosovo (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 17. State sovereignty has two facets: (1) internally, the state holds 
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world is primarily designed to make inter-state violence less frequent. In the 1990s, inter-state 
intervention, was at odds with the cardinal principle of state sovereignty. The intervention 
over Kosovo, discussed later in this thesis, is an example of this disagreement. Joseph Nye 
argued that “sovereignty” was a slippery term. Those who resist multilateralism would define 
sovereignty narrowly as domestic authority and control.51 However, all members of the United 
Nations (UN) are bound by the UN Charter’s articles.52 A centerpiece of the UN Charter 
regime is a flat prohibition against the use for force by individual states as enshrined in 
Chapter I, Article 2 (4)53:  
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
This bias is reinforced by a ban against UN intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state, set out in the UN Charter’s Chapter I, Article 2 (7): 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. 
  
The UN Charter’s Chapter VII permits the Security Council to advocate military intervention 
in the interests of international peace and security: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.54   
With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of bipolar competition and the 
consequent threat of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto, along with the 
increase in civil conflicts, caused the U.S. Administrations to rethink their role because of the 
demand for involvement in new humanitarian crises had increased significantly. Somalia 
established, as presented in the successive subchapter, the link between humanitarian 
objectives and the use of U.S. military force. In the Balkans, when Yugoslavia broke apart, 
the international community would be confused by conflict between two principles: self 
determination and territorial sovereignty. International reluctance to become embroiled in the 
                                                                                                                                             
final decision-making authority and (2) externally, there is formal equality between all states. This norm of state sovereignty 
confers on states to determine their own domestic affairs which can contradict the protection of individual human rights 
51 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 163. 
52 The UN Charter states that obligations to the UN prevails over all others treaty obligations 
53 Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, 17. 
54 See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39.  
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Kosovo crisis in 1998 was initially based on the widely accepted international law norm of 
non-intervention in domestic affairs of a sovereign state, as guaranteed by the UN Charter. 
2.3 U.S. Post Cold War interventions in Iraq and Somalia 
The first real test of the Weinberger Doctrine and the use of overwhelming force came 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August1990.55  President George H. Bush responded rapidly 
by issuing several Executive Orders imposing a comprehensive embargo against Iraq and 
additional economic measures.56  In response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a lengthy series 
of UNSC resolutions were passed.57 On 16 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm, began 
when a U.S.-led coalition attacked Iraq.58  In a speech to the American people a few hours 
after the armed conflict began, President Bush said:  
Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The 
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and 
Kuwait will once again be free.59 
The use of overwhelming force showed the American public a wholehearted refutation 
of the failed gradualism of Vietnam.60 The impact of new technologies, especially the use of 
air power with its new precision guided munitions received lots of attention from politicians, 
the public and the media.61  The Gulf War was generally considered a political and military 
success because the objectives were clear and limited, the available military force was well-
suited to achieve the political and military objectives, and the operation was supported by 
Congress and the public.62  
                                              
55 To obtain a  more comprehensive insight into the political considerations, the military planning and the execution of the 
First Gulf War see: Alberto Bin, Richard Hill and Archer Jones, Desert Storm: A forgotten war (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 1998). For a better account and military analysis of the actions leading up to the decisive victory of Operation 
Desert Storm see Robert H. Scales jr., Certain Victory (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc, 1997).  
56 President George H. Bush, Letter to Congressional leaders on Additional Economic Measures Taken with Respect to Iraq 
and Kuwait, 9 August 1990.  
57 See UNSC Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990 which demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces unconditionally to the 
positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990. The most important was UNSC Resolution 678 that gave Iraq a 
withdrawal deadline of 15 January 1991. UNSC Resolution 678 – for the first time since the Korean War, invoked Art. 42, 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use “all means necessary” to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the sovereignty 
and original borders of Kuwait. See also UNSC Resolution 661 placing economic sanctions on Iraq.  
58 U.S. troops represented more than 70 % of the coalition’s 956.000 troops in Iraq.  
59 President George H. Bush, Address to the Nation announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, White House, 
January 16, 1991.  
60 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, (New York: Public Affairs Perseus, 
2001), 7. 
61 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, Bush, Clinton and the Generals, (New York: Scribner, 2001), 12. 
62 It can be argued that the Gulf War met all six of the major tests presented by Caspar Weinberger in 1984.  
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Two peripheral humanitarian crises were escalating early in 1992 and called on the 
Bush Administration: Somalia and BiH. Neither of these crises involved vital U.S. interests. 
However, Somalia became the first American military intervention solely for humanitarian 
purposes.63 The Bush Administration was consistent in its opposition to sending U.S. forces to 
Somalia.64 Consequently, editorials in the New York Times criticized the Administration and 
demanded that the President take action in Somalia to quell the warlords.65 Obviously, 
President Bush changed his mind on Somalia.66 On December 3, 1992, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to intervene with military forces under the 
authority of the UN Charters Chapter VII, and created the U.S.-led Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF).67  On December 9, a joint force of 1,300 U.S. troops landed in Mogadishu and 
within weeks 24,000 other U.S. military forces joined them on the ground in Somalia.68 The 
deployment to Somalia was accepted by the President-elect Bill Clinton. By not rejecting the 
President’s letter of notice to Congress in accordance with the War Powers Act, the Congress 
did authorize the action by their silent consent.69 However, in a letter from President Bush to 
Congress dated December 14, 1992, the President claimed: 
In my judgment, the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces under U.S. command to 
Somalia as part of this multilateral response to the Resolution is necessary to 
address a major humanitarian calamity, avert related threats to international 
peace and security, and protect the safety of Americans and other engaged in 
this relief operation …We do not intend that U.S. Armed Forces deployed to 
Somalia become involved in hostilities.70 
The intervention into Somalia was regarded by many as a unique geopolitical event 
where U.S. Armed Forces were deployed for a humanitarian action in an area where no 
American security interests seemed to be involved. Elaboration is needed on two major 
questions: (1) why did President Bush ultimately decide to launch a U.S. military intervention 
                                              
63 During the Cold War, Somalia was regarded as a strategic asset because of its strategic geographic location. For the United 
States, Somalia had mainly been considered of strategic interest because the Soviets had established airbases there which 
could interdict oil shipments and commerce transiting the Red Sea. When the Soviet Union was thrown out of Somalia, there 
was no threat to U.S. interests.   
64 However critics, in August 1992, the U.S. provided approximately 1500 troops deployed to Kenya and thousand of tons of 
humanitarian aid by air and sealift in Operation Provide Relief to assist with the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. 
65 See editorials in New York Times: “The Hell Called Somalia,” July 22, 1992 and “Don’t Forsake Somalia,” November 4, 
1992. Available at www.nytimes.com  accessed April 10, 2009. 
66 Albright, Madame Secretary, 142. In November 1992, acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger informed the UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that the United States was willing to lead a multinational relief effort to Somalia 
67 UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) on Somalia.  
68 It should be noted the all together, twenty-five nations provided 14,000 foreign and 24,000 U.S. forces in Operation 
Restore Hope in accordance with UNSC Resolution 794.  
69 See William G. Hyland, Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 51. See also 
Bill Clinton My Life (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 550.  
70 President George Bush, “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.” Letter to Congress, December 14, 1992.  
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in peripheral Somalia after he had lost the presidential election? And, (2) why did the CJCS, 
General Powell, reverse his arguments presented in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine? Jon 
Western, presented several plausible conventional explanations that would not violate the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: (1) the situation in Somalia became dire and only America 
possessed the capabilities needed; (2) the mission in Somalia was well-defined and 
achievable; (3) the intervention in Somalia could be done with overwhelming force; (4) public 
and Congressional support was widespread; and (5) the political and military objectives were 
clearly defined.71 These puzzling arguments can be accepted as a prevailing rational 
explanation for the U.S. intervention in Somalia.  However, Western concluded by suggesting 
another prevailing explanation. He argued that Somalia was selected by Bush and Powell 
because the situation in Somalia was assessed as a far easier mission to achieve than BiH.72 
By deploying U.S. forces to Somalia, Bush in his final days of his presidency proved some 
humanitarian activism by meeting the critics in Congress and the media who had blamed him 
for not exhibiting to the world his sincerity in establishing “a kinder and gentler America” by 
his inaction towards the crises in Somalia and BiH. Bush’s approach in Somalia made an 
announcement containing “seeds” for a new doctrine; that the U.S. would fight for human and 
moral values, in contrast to the experiences under the Cold War.73  Expectations for U.S. 
involvements were raised in Liberia, Sudan, East Timor, BiH and elsewhere. At first, the 
humanitarian operation in Somalia preceded without much controversy, even if the initial 
Bush objective of “restoring order” was changed by the Clinton Administration to “total 
pacification and nation building.” In the coming months the humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia would turn out to be a major political challenge for the Clinton Administration, 
discussed in the following chapters.   
2.4 The break up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
A complete history of the breakup of the former Socialistic Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia74 starting in the 1980s would be too much for this thesis. However, the four wars, 
                                              
71 Western, Selling Intervention & War, 134.  
72 Ibid, 135-37. See also Joe Klein, The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (New York: Broadway 
Books, 2002), 68 
73 Talentino, Military Intervention after the Cold War, 122-26. See also Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons 
Learned (Washington D.C: Defense University Press, 1995). 
74 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised the six republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, BiH and 
Macedonia. Hereafter, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be named “Yugoslavia”.  
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the ethnic cleansing75  and massacres that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 have 
very complex origins, steeped in lies, myth, and history that go back to 1463 and conquest of 
the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire. Due to its origins and its violent history, Yugoslavia 
could not withstand the totality of the pressures from: (1) the economic crisis throughout the 
1980s;76 (2) the end of the Cold War; (3) the demise of the national Communist Party; (4) the 
loss of domestic cohesion that stemmed from the 1974 Constitution;77 (5) the rise in ethno-
nationalism; (6) the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the concurrent fear this created among 
Orthodox and Catholic Christians and (7) the end of President Josip Broz Tito’s leadership.78 
Yugoslavia would soon cease to exist.  
The international community, represented by the UN, the European Community (EC), 
and individual states such as the United States failed to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia.79 
The breakup was not favored but the major international actors were not prepared or willing to 
take forceful actions to stop it. Moreover, the breakup of Yugoslavia was confused by conflict 
between the two principles: self determination and territorial sovereignty. The assumptions 
that recognition of the former Yugoslav republics as new sovereign nations would serve as a 
preventive measure against further conflicts seems to have been an erroneous approach. 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, summed up the nationalistic 
manipulation conducted in Yugoslavia: 
The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top down… 
a manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically prevailed more 
than war and in which a quarter of the population were in mixed marriages. The 
                                              
75 Ethnic cleansing is a term coined during the war. It does not mean genocide, as defined by the Geneva Conventions. It 
involves the forced migration of one ethnic group from an area by another, so as to create zones inhabited by one 
homogeneous ethno-religious people. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 34; and Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of 
Yugoslavia, 166-68.  
76 In December 1989 inflation reached the level of 2,500 percent annually. See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction 
of Yugoslavia, 28.  
77 The 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia ensured that no ethnic group dominated the Yugoslavian state.  
78 For a more comprehensive background, see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: 
Penguin, 1992); Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusion (London: Pluto Press, 2002); 
Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, BBC, 1997) and Noel Malcolm, 
Bosnia a short history (London: Pan Books, 2002).  
79 Sanctions were used as diplomatic tools wielded in the Yugoslav conflicts. Several UNSC Resolutions were imposed. See 
for example: UNSC Resolution 713 (September 1991) establishing a complete arms embargo, UNSC Resolution 757 (May 
30, 1992) included a trade embargo for Serbia and Montenegro,  a ban in participating in sports events, technical and 
scientific cooperation, transfer of funds and aircraft travel, UNSC Resolution 757 (November 1992) prohibited transshipment 
of certain strategic goods through Serbia and Montenegro, UNSC Resolution 820 (April 1993) prohibited the transshipment 
of all goods through Serbia and Montenegro. A total of eighty-three resolutions on Yugoslavia emanated from UNSC 
between 1991 and 1995. Additional UNSC Resolutions followed when the crisis in Kosovo later escalated.  The sanctions 
had severe impact on the Serbian economy. See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 195. 
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manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic violence in order to engender 
animosities that could then be magnified by the press, leading to further violence.80 
Overview of major events in BiH (1991-1995) 
The violent crises in former Yugoslavia further escalated in March 1992, when also 
BiH, the most ethnically- and religiously-mixed state among the former Yugoslav republics 
claimed its independence.81  For complex historic reasons, the balance between the three 
ethnicities82 in BiH depended on its insertion in a balanced Yugoslavia.  The line of previous 
conflicts in BiH has run mainly between (Catholic) Croatia and (Orthodox) Serbia with the 
(Muslim) Bosniaks caught between.83  The secessions of Slovenia and Croatia would 
unbalance the Yugoslav Federation increasing the relative weight of Serbia.84 As the war in 
Croatia intensified in the autumn of 1991 the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat 
representatives who constituted almost 60 percent of the Republic of BiH Parliamentary 
Assembly, declared independence from Yugoslavia.85  The outcome of the referendum held 
on March 1, 1992, which a majority of the Bosnian Serbs boycotted, was that 99 percent voted 
in favor of independence.86  By boycotting this referendum, the Bosnian Serbs appeared to the 
outside world that they refused to play the democratic game and that they were against a 
multi-ethnic BiH. However, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted because they were strongly against 
the referendum procedure that they believed to be unconstitutional.87 On March 3, 1992 
President Izetbegović proclaimed the independence of the Republic of BiH. Backed by Serbia, 
the Bosnian Serbs demanded that BiH withdrew its declaration of independence.88 
                                              
80 Warren Zimmerman, “The last Ambassador: A memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, no. 2, 
(1995): 2-20.  
81 Halberstam argued that Slobodan Milosević, the President of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman, the President of Croatia met 
secretly at Karadjordjevo on March 25, 1991 to make a mutually advantageous deal to carve up BiH in two parts. Milosević 
never admitted that this meeting took place. See Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 95. See also Doder and Branson, 
Milosević, 88.  
82 The three major ethnicities in BiH were based on the 1991 census: Bosnian Muslims (43.7 percent or 1.9 million people), 
Bosnian Serbs (31.3 percent or 1.3 million people) and the Bosnian Croats (17.3 percent or 753.000 people). The last 8.7 
percent comprised other groups; Montenegrins, Gypsies, Albanians and Yugoslavs. See Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the 
Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 26.  
83 Ibid, 13. 
84 See Johnstone, Fools Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, 42. 
85 Sovereign status declared 15 October 1991. The Bosnian Serb delegates, the minority, protested by abstaining from the 
vote by leaving the parliamentary chamber.  On January 25, 1992, the same majority pressed for a vote on a resolution to 
hold a public referendum on independence, and once again, the Bosnian Serb delegates boycotted the vote. 
86 See Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 121.  
87 See Johnstone, Fools Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, 43. The Bosnian Serb political leaders followed 
up their opposition towards the majority vote by proclaiming the “Serbian Republic of BiH” on January 9, 1992 and pledged 
their loyalty to their fellow Serbs in Belgrade. 
88 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 34-35. 
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Even if there were strong domestic disagreements within BiH, international recognition 
of the new European nation soon followed.89  In light of this international recognition, intense 
fighting among the three ethnicities materialized in April 1992, when the Serb-led JNA forces 
moved into the newborn nation of BiH to take control of a majority of the territory and to 
protect the interests of the Bosnian Serbs.90 Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, and strategic center 
of gravity was rapidly surrounded by the Bosnian Serb Army. More than 900 days of siege 
and lethal bombardment of Sarajevo followed. As the world watched with fascination and 
horror the tragedy of Sarajevo, the city where the Winter Olympics in 1984 had been 
successfully held, an even more devastating campaign was taking place in small villages 
throughout BiH.91 
In order to understand the severe complexity of the conflicts in BiH, it has to be 
emphasized that this violent war was not between just two domestic parties. It was between 
the three domestic ethnicities each supported by external powers. Each ethnic group formed 
their own army. 92 On some occasions and in some areas, mixes of alliances between two of 
the parties were established to fight the third. The Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat conflict 
escalated in the spring of 1993 when the warring parties began battling over Croat-controlled 
lands in central and southern BiH. This fighting left the Bosnian Serbs with a decisive military 
advantage and little incentive to concede territory during negotiations.93 In March 1994 after 
intense negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, mediated by the 
United States, a truce, alliance power-sharing arrangement was agreed upon by these two 
sides.94 The fighting throughout BiH and the siege and bombardment of Sarajevo continued 
through 1994. When NATO95 in April 1994 responded by air attacks on Bosnian Serb 
                                              
89 The European Community recognized BiH as an independent nation on April 6, 1992. The next day, on April 7, 1992, the 
U.S. also recognized BiH. The UN General Assembly accepted Croatia, Slovenia and BiH as full members on 22 May 1992. 
90 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace Bush, Clinton and the Generals, 122-123; Doder and Branson, Milosević, 99-101; and 
Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 165.When hostilities broke out in BiH, the Bosnian Serbs had 
well-equipped armed forces of 90.000 soldiers at their disposal. Serb officers from the JNA in other former republics of 
Yugoslavia were assigned to support the Bosnian Serb Army. It should also be noted that Milosević unleashed paramilitary 
gangs – “The Tigers”, “The White Eagles” and others as part of the Serb operations in BiH. These paramilitary gangs were 
motivated by the prospect of plundering.  
91 Hundreds of villages were destroyed; the village populations killed or forced to leave their homes and belongings.  The 
true pattern, systematic “ethnic cleansing,” was predominantly in Bosnian Muslim dominated areas. 
92 Atrocities, forced evictions, and genocide were committed by all three major ethno-religious groups in BiH. Additionally, 
thousands of foreign troops (Serbian, Montenegrins, Croatian and Mujahedin Jihadist) volunteers from the Middle East 
joined in the internecine war in BiH.   
93 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 27.  
94 The Washington Agreement created the Federation of BiH and recognized two chains of command for BiH component 
arms.  
95 In response to UNSC Resolution 816 (1993) NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight which was a NATO air operation 
that began April 12, 1993 to enforce the UN no-fly zone air space restrictions at the Balkans. Based on UNSC Resolution 836 
(June 1993) the NATO mission expanded to include close air support (CAS) for UN units on the ground in BiH and to carry 
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command control sites and ammunition sites, the Bosnian Serbs and the JNA took hundreds of 
UN peacekeepers hostage.96 The UN concluded it had little choice but to put the safety of its 
peacekeepers first and reject demands for additional NATO air strikes.97 Daalder argued this 
situation demonstrated the contradiction between using air power to punish and 
simultaneously having lightly armed dispersed troops on the ground that were taken hostage 
by those the international community was punishing.98 The images of UN troops as hostages 
presented on television were an embarrassment for UN, NATO, and the EU.   
Former President Jimmy Carter had, on initiative from the Bosnian Serbs, negotiated a 
four month cease-fire that went into effect January 1, 1995.99 By the spring of 1995 almost 
300,000 people had been killed and 1.2 million were refugees’.100. The military developments 
that took place in the spring of 1995 would be decisive for BiH. With the melting snow, 
fighting again erupted in full force not only in BiH, but also in Croatia, causing new huge 
waves of refugees when the Croatian Army forcefully reestablished control over Croatian 
regions western Slavonia and the Krajina. In Sarajevo, the sporadic shelling of the city by the 
Serbs continued. The UNPROFOR on the ground in BiH was not mandated with enforcement 
powers to respond forcefully to the Serbs attack on the six UN-declared “safe areas.”101  The 
UN’s failure to respond only emboldened the Bosnian Serbs and increased the incentives for 
the Bosnian Muslims to launch their own offensives. The multinational Contact Group102 
continued unsuccessfully its diplomatic efforts to engage the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs 
                                                                                                                                             
out strikes/bombing against Bosnian Serb targets. Twelve NATO members contributed forces to this operation that ended 
December 20, 1995.   
96 Bosnian Serb and Serbian JNA forces successfully adopted the tactic of capturing UNPROFOR soldiers and chaining them 
to potential Serb targets for NATO attacks. 
97 See Christopher, In the Stream of History, 348. 
98 See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 41-42.    
99 Former President Jimmy Carter held, in December 1994, extensive discussions with the presidents of BiH, Croatia, and 
Serbia; the UN special representative for the former Yugoslavia; U.S. representatives to the Contact Group and the leadership 
of the Bosnian Serbs. An agreement on a four month cease-fire was reached. Available at: 
http://www.jimmycarter.com/countries/bosnia.html accessed April 2, 2009.  It should be noted that there were more than 30 
ceasefires and peace-agreements in BiH. All of them collapsed 
100 Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 1 
101  UNSC Resolution 819 (1993) declared six areas to be “safe areas” under UN protection. Among these safe areas were 
Srebrenica. UNPROFOR was intended to be a traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation and therefore impartial, 
especially in the face of mounting ethnic cleansing and genocide. Despite of the references to the UN Charter’s chapter VII in 
the resolutions that applied to UNPROFOR, it remained a peace-keeping not peace-enforcement operation. Consequently, 
force could only be used in self-protection. However, in August 1995 UNPROFOR was mandated with greater enforcement 
powers.   
102 In April 1994 a new actor the Contact Group consisting of the United States, Russia, Germany, France and Britain 
appeared on the scene in international efforts to mediate the conflict in BiH. The Contact Group took up where the EU, the 
OCCE and the UN had failed in bringing the three warring parties to the negotiating table. It should be noted that the Contact 
Group included four out of five fixed members of UNSC. Only China was missing. China’s position was an unknown, 
therefore avoiding the UNSC and a possible veto gave President Clinton more control and less risk of a veto. 
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in Pale103  The next diplomatic step was to persuade the Serbian strongman, the President of 
Serbia, Slobodan Milosević to force the Bosnian Serbs in Pale to the negotiation table.104   
However, in the summer of 1995 full force fighting in BiH and in Croatia would 
overtake the diplomatic efforts. During twenty weeks from late July 1995, when the situation 
in BiH seemed most hopeless, a serious of new diplomatic efforts, military actions and peace-
negotiations ended the war in BiH. First, the Croat offensive during the summer and the 
NATO large-scale bombing of Bosnian Serb targets in September created the ideal 
opportunity for the final push for a negotiated settlement in BiH.105 Subsequently, a cease-fire 
was achieved in October, successful peace negotiations were held in Dayton, Ohio in 
November and the final peace agreement called the Dayton Accords was signed in Paris on 
December 14, 1995. In late December 1995, NATO deployed 60,000 troops to BiH, among 
them 20,000 American troops.106  
Overview of historical background for the conflict in Kosovo 
Kosovo has two complex histories, often mutually exclusive and frequently antagonistic. 
For the two major ethnic groups in Kosovo; the majority the Kosovar Albanians and the 
minority the Kosovski Serbs the “truths on Kosovo” are based on two sets of complex 
interpretations of combinations of historical, demographic and legal details rendering the 
judgment on which ethnic group has the most rightful claim to the territory of Kosovo. For the 
two parties it seems possible to prove almost anything by choosing the right starting point. 
Subsequently, the main arguments about the status of Kosovo are mirror opposites one 
another.107 Each side claims the same territory, and in which each has an amount of validity to 
its arguments and good reasons to distrust the other. Both ethnic groups have used their 
interpretation of the history in Kosovo to enlighten foreign observers in attempts to build 
sympathy for their own territorial claims. Both sides present their case to the international 
community as being the most legitimate and therefore deserving attention and considerations. 
The constant references, from both sides, to historical events in Kosovo, seem to reinforce the 
                                              
103 Radovan Karadzic was President and leader for the Bosnian Serbs in the “Serbian Republic of BiH” from 1992 until 1996. 
His political and military headquarters was in Pale. 
104  See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 39.  The principal Contact Group leverage over President Milosević was the prospect of 
lifting economic sanctions imposed on Serbia by the UN. Many earlier negotiation efforts of both the United States and the 
Europeans had dealt with the Bosnian Serbs as a separate entity.  
105 Between August 30 and September 20, 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force.  
106 The NATO troops deployed was the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) with a one year mission from December 
20, 1995. On December 21, 1996 the task of IFOR was taken over by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). 
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Western myth of Balkan complexities. The most prevailing image among both Serbs and 
Kosovar Albanians is that of “being the victim” to the other group’s atrocities.108 The history 
of Kosovo shows that today’s oppressors would be tomorrows oppressed. On both sides legal 
arguments are dubious; nevertheless they are used in nationalist rhetoric. The 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution gave Kosovo increased freedom, making it a federal unit with rights almost equal 
to that of the six Yugoslav republics.  However, during February and March 1989, Slobodan 
Milosević crushed Kosovo’s autonomy.109 Julie A Mertus has argued that the conflict in 
Kosovo cannot be attributed to ancient hatred alone rather it was a result of recent hatred 
fueled by propaganda campaigns.110 The immediate cause of the Kosovo conflict was 
Slobodan Milosević and his oppression of the Kosovo Albanians in the preceding decade. 
However, after the peace settlement in BiH and the signing of the Dayton Accords the 
situation on the ground in Kosovo deteriorated. Richard Caplan argued, “To countless 
Kosovar Albanians, Dayton had already demonstrated the limits of international support – 
and, by extension, of Rugova’s own effectiveness.”111 The understanding that ethnic violence 
and atrocities committed by Serbian forces is what finally led a reluctant U.S. intervention and 
negotiation of the Dayton Accords strengthened those in Kosovo who urged military actions 
against the Serbs.112 Louis Sell claimed that President Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo Albanian 
leader, made a mistake when he went too far in believing that the international community and 
especially the U.S. would support independence for Kosovo. The Albanian President Sali 
                                                                                                                                             
107 See Julie A Mertus, Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war (Berkley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California 
Press, 1999), xvii. 
108 See Lasar Nikolić, “Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo,” printed in Understanding the War in 
Kosovo edited by Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 54. See also Mertus, 
Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war, 1. 
109 See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 81-87. In his efforts to strengthen his own political 
power, Milosević, appealed to the Serbian nationalist by denouncing the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo as being unwanted 
illegal immigrants forced on the Serb population by foreign governments. At the end of March 1989, many of the provisions 
of the 1974 Constitution were declared null and void. The Albanian delegates in the Kosovo Assembly who stood up against 
Milosević were expelled from the Assembly, dismissed from their positions and threatened with criminal prosecution.  
110 See Mertus, Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war, 5. 
111 Richard Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo”, International Affairs, Vol. 4, No 74, 1998.  
112 Ibrahim Rugova who emerged as Kosovo’s leader was a literary historian and writer. His position was that Kosovo should 
become independent. Rugova preached passive resistance against the Serbs. In 1989 he founded the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK). President Rugova wanted to gradually move the Kosovar Albanians toward independence, but without 
violence. It should be noted that U.S. diplomats encouraged Rugova to persevere his path of nonviolent resistance. Rugova 
convinced Kosovar Albanians to believe that a favourable resolution on the Kosovo issue would be a part of a peace treaty 
for BiH. When this did not occur, critics rose against Rugova and his policy of non-violence. See Mertus, Kosovo: How 
myths and truths started a war, 6; and Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 92, 264. 
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Berisha furthermore undermined Rugova’s policy approach when he in December 1996 
advocated:113 
…it is very clear for the Kosovo people that their freedom and rights will not come as a 
gift from anyone and their problems will not be solved in Tirana, Belgrade or 
Washington, London and Paris. They are solved and will be solved in Pristina and the 
towns and villages in Kosovo.  
Radical and impatient young Kosovo Albanians in 1996-97 began to organize a clandestine 
military organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), in effect creating a armed 
revolutionary army, that were effectively repudiating Rugova’s policy of non-violence.114  
Their disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s policy at the Dayton Accords in 
regards to Kosovo was a crucial factor in the rise of the KLA. Starting in 1996, the KLA 
launched isolated terrorist attacks on Serb police patrols and other Serb targets that provoked 
swift retribution. The KLA’s objective was heightening tension between Kosovo Serbs and 
Kosovar Albanians which would strengthen their long-term political cause - independence. As 
the Serbian government would inevitably strike back at the KLA, the West would witness 
Serb atrocities in an ever escalating cycle of violence, and thus would provoke U.S. and 
European intervention on the side of the Kosovar Albanians.115 The Serbs responded, as the 
KLA expected with increasing spirals of violence. In December 1996, the UN General 
Assembly condemned human rights abuses in Kosovo.116 The U.S. Department of State 
reported in 1997: 
Ethnic Albanians continue to suffer at the hands of security forces conducting 
searches for arms. Human rights observers report that the police, without 
following proper legal procedures, frequently extract "confessions" during 
interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet, hands, genital 
areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists, nightsticks, and 
occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be no reprisals 
and, in an attempt to intimidate the wider community, police often beat persons in 
front of their families.117   
                                              
113 Quoted in Doder and Branson, Milosević, 238-39. President Berisha’s remarks were reported by Reuter agency from 
Tirana on December 27, 1996.  
114 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was officially regarded by the U.S. as a terrorist group until 1998. However, the 
Clinton Administration cultivated diplomatic relationships with KLA leaders. In 1997 it is estimated that the KLA had 
between 15,000 and 20,000 members. Late in 1999 the KLA was officially disbanded and their members entered the Kosovo 
Protection Corps (KPC). Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 366.  
115 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 367. 
116 See United Nations General Assembly, UN Document: Situation on human rights in Kosovo. A/RES/51/111 of March 5, 
1997. Available at:  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-111.htm accessed May 2, 2009.  
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Shredding every trace of dependence on Serbia became the KLA’s primary 
objective.118 On the other hand, Milosević’s objective was to keep Kosovo firmly within 
Serbia’s control, while intimidating the ethnic Albanian population into leaving the province. 
The Serb pressure on the KLA and the Kosovar Albanian population increased in such a way 
during the spring and summer of 1998 that villages were burned, potential KLA leaders were 
murdered, and more than hundred thousand Kosovar civilians escaped their homes and 
became refugees.  By provoking the Serbs into responding to the KLA attacks with 
overwhelming and sustained force, the KLA leaders achieved more or less what they wanted - 
increased international and domestic attention. A complete story of the history of Kosovo 
would be too much for this thesis.119  
The Bush Administration’s responses to the crises in the Balkans 
It was not a surprise for the Bush Administration that a major test of the post Cold War 
era would take place in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. According to William Hyland, 
Washington had worried about Yugoslavia for more that forty years. These worries had been 
relatively simple: when the communist dictatorship of Tito weakened or was over, Yugoslavia 
would break apart into ethnic components and the Soviet Union would then intervene to 
restore “order.”120  The question was how should the United States respond?  According to the 
last U.S. ambassador in former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, in 1990, the CIA predicted 
that Yugoslavia would break up within eighteen months.121  When the expected break up 
became a reality in 1991, the Soviet Union was collapsing and unable to respond to the 
situation, in Yugoslavia. When the crisis in the Balkans rose to the attention of the Bush 
Administration, President Bush chose to stay out of this violent conflict.  Because the Cold 
War and the bipolar struggle had ended, the American approach towards the Balkans also 
changed.  There were no vital U.S. interests in the former Yugoslavia. The crisis in 
Yugoslavia was viewed by the Bush Administration as a European problem that would best be 
                                              
118 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 366-67 and 397. KLA’s approaches were: (1) attack Serb interests on the ground and 
thereby escalate the tensions and provoke Milosević to retaliate in a way that provided sympathy for the cause of the Kosovar 
Albanians; and (2) wrest power away from President Rugova and his non-violence approach. The realization of these two 
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119 For a deeper understanding of the history of Kosovo see Noel Malcolm’s book: Kosovo a Short History, (London: 
Macmillan, 1998).  
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settled by the Europeans.122  The message Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, delivered 
to European allies was: “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”123  The President of the European 
Community (EC) Jacques Delores fully agreed with Washington’s view, by arguing that he 
hoped “that since the EC did not intervene in American affairs, the United States would have 
enough respect not to interfere in European affairs.”124 Within the EC, Yugoslavia was 
initially regarded as a sole European affair.125  The principal EC countries; France, Britain and 
Germany wanted to retain their diplomatic efforts in Yugoslavia in their own hands and help 
the UN maintain a neutral presence. Consequently, NATO had to be sidetracked; a leading 
position for NATO in the Balkans would have meant a major U.S. influence, an influence 
neither Washington nor the major European powers wanted.  However, brandishing the threat 
of military intervention, European leaders apparently ignored the practical limits of power.  
President Francois Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany announced 
their support for a European force to solve the problems in the former Yugoslavia. Their 
statements were seen by military experts as “empty” promises intended to win domestic 
support.126  The Bush Administration acceded to Europe’s determination to take the lead in 
Yugoslavia, a situation upon which the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosević, would soon 
capitalize. Secretary of State, James Baker who visited Belgrade in June 1991 warned the 
Yugoslav strongman, Slobodan Milosević that the U.S. would not recognize a break-up or 
recognize any resulting new states. Milosević seems to have concluded that he had nothing to 
fear from the United States.127  The UN response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia 
was to impose an arms embargo against all parties, an action that grew out of intentions to 
block Russian support to Serbia. The arms embargo strongly favored the Serb Army because 
they controlled and were in possession of most of the weapons belonging to the JNA.  
David Halberstam argued that the Bush Administration was slow to react to the 
situation in Yugoslavia for three main reasons: (1) the first and most obvious was the still 
                                              
122 Albright, Madam Secretary, 179. For the reader to fully understand where the European nations stood in relations to the 
former republics of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, it is necessary to see where they had been at the outbreak of World War I 
in 1914 and World War II in 1940. See also Holbrooke, To End a War, 31-33. 
123 Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United. The evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2004), 117. 
124 Quoted from Peter W. Rodman, “Bosnian Quagmire” in National Review June 26, 1995. See also Hyland, Clintons World: 
Remaking American Foreign Policy, 30. It should also be noted that the Yugoslav crisis coincided with a feeling of a new 
European self-confidence. The Mastrict Treaty had convinced political leaders that Europe was in a position to play a more 
comprehensive role in international diplomacy, especially in Europe.  
125 See Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 86-94. 
126 International Herald Tribune, “EC’s Missteps: Did They Fuel Yugoslav Conflict”, September 21, 1991.   
127 Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia”, Foreign Affairs vol. 74 (1995), 11-12. 
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existing ghosts of Vietnam, the immense resistance of the Pentagon to military involvement, 
the great fear of being sucked into a Balkan quagmire; (2) downsizing of U.S. forces and the 
on-going deployments to enforce the peace in Kuwait and Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War in 1991; and (3) the future of Eastern Europe and its relations with Russia.128 William 
Hyland argued along the same lines; the Bush Administration was adamantly opposed to 
military intervention by U.S. ground forces. Bush and his military advisors saw not another 
Desert Storm, but another Vietnam, a bloody conflict with no clear exit strategy. However, 
even if an exit strategy could be devised, the conflicts in Yugoslavia were assessed as no 
threat to vital American interests. Finally, the crisis was viewed as a European problem that 
should and could be settled by Europeans.129  In the Balkans as a whole and in BiH in 
particular, there were no clear military objectives justifying deploying an American force. By 
rejecting the use of U.S. military strength for any purpose in BiH, President Bush effectively 
deferred the design of a Western policy. Sell argued President Bush decided early on that 
Yugoslavia did not touch vital U.S. interests.130  
2.5 Summary 
President Clinton’s arrival in the White House coincided with one of the great turning 
points in modern history: The bipolar struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States 
had dissolved. Consequently, Cold War alignments lost meaning. President Bush, Clinton’s 
predecessor, brought back the phrase “New World Order,” as well as to initiate a cooperative 
U.S. role in assisting the UN and allied nations to secure stability through multi-lateral 
economic, diplomatic and military actions. President Bush took action, successfully 
orchestrating the international community to overturn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This use 
of military force against Iraq, which met the major tests presented in the Weinberger Doctrine, 
showed the American public a wholehearted refutation of the failed gradualism of Vietnam 
and convinced the American public that the U.S. military had recovered from the malaise of 
the Vietnam debacle. The apparent success in Iraq also gave rise to a short lived revival of 
U.S. enthusiasm for the UN. In the waning days of his Presidency, George H. Bush, 
intervened in Somalia for strictly humanitarian reasons, but chose not to interfere in the break 
up of Yugoslavia which had erupted into a war in the Balkans. However, the intervention in 
Somalia contained the seeds of a new doctrine; that U.S. troops would fight for human and 
                                              
128 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 32.  
129 Hyland, Clintons World: Remaking American Foreign Policy, 31-32. 
  
37
moral values. The hopes for what President Bush called a peaceful “New World Order” in 
Europe, was destroyed in Yugoslavia. The Bush Administration acceded to Europe’s 
determination to take the lead in former Yugoslavia because the conflicts in Yugoslavia were 
assessed as no threat to vital American interests. President Bush seemed happy for the EC to 
assume the lead in efforts to stop the violence in BiH, limiting U.S.’s own actions to little 
more than supportive votes in the UNSC. In fairness to President George H. Bush, no 
American president since the end of World War II seem to have confronted such complex and 
extensive global turmoil as he did on his watch.  
                                                                                                                                             
130 See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 205.  
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3. Case no. 1: Explaining U.S. engagement in BiH 
The conflict in Bosnia deserves American engagement: it is a vast humanitarian 
tragedy; it is driven by ethnic barbarism; it stemmed from aggression against an 
independent state; it lies alongside the established and emerging market 
democracies of Europe and can all too easily explode into a wider Balkan conflict. 
          ---Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor131 
  
The objective of this chapter is to examine the key factors shaping U.S. policy toward 
BiH and the role each of the five chosen power centers played. The author seeks to disclose 
(1) what were the factors that moved U.S. policy from being characterized by distancing itself 
from getting too deeply involved in the crises in BiH to engagement; (2) who were the 
dominant power centers shaping President Clinton’s decisions; and (3) how the power centers 
perceived their approach to produce a desirable result. The focus is on the contemporary 
debates and decision-making processes in Washington and Belgrade during this transition 
period by employing Roger Hilsman’s political process model as described in Chapter One.  
3.1 President Clinton’s views and interests 
The election of Bill Clinton as President of the U.S. in 1992 demonstrated that 
domestic issues were at the core of the nation’s attention and that foreign policy was losing its 
political value with the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Consequently, the centerpiece of 
President Clinton’s political mandate was to get the domestic economic “house in order.” In 
domestic policy, President Clinton took a hands-on approach. Clinton weighted into 
discussions with facts and opinions in debates among his domestic specialists.132 Clinton’s 
understanding of economics included underpinning both his foreign policy goal of democratic 
enlargement and the strategy of international engagement.133  In Clinton’s view, traditional 
power politics was an inadequate guide to meet post Cold War challenges because it did not 
account for modern economic trends and requirements.134 Subsequently, globalization became 
                                              
131 Anthony Lake. “From Containment to Enlargement.” Speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 
September 21, 1993.  
132 See Woodward, The Agenda. Inside the Clinton White House. This book gives several examples how President Clinton 
took an unusual hands-on approach on domestic issues.  
133 The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”, i.   
134 The formal process for making foreign and national security policy in the Clinton Administrations was set forth in 
Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive Number 2 (PDD-2) – “Organization of the National Security Council.”  White 
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a theme President Clinton preached with conviction both at home and aboard. In a speech 
delivered at American University on February 26, 1993 President Clinton argued: 
….we must update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it 
and to foster democracy and human rights around the world….our leadership is 
especially important for the world’s new and emerging democracies. To grow and 
deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle class and a civic culture, they need the ability 
to tap into a growing global economy. And our security and our prosperity will be 
greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay 
democracies.135 
During 1993 the situation on the ground in BiH continued to deteriorate significantly, 
raising questions about the nature of the United State’s post Cold War commitment to Europe. 
President Clinton did not carry out what Candidate Clinton had proposed.136 Clinton failed to 
back his forceful presidential campaign rhetoric on BiH with action: First, like his immediate 
predecessor, President Clinton was not willing to take the lead, subsequently he distanced 
himself from the European allies’ negotiation efforts:137 Secondly, Clinton showed little 
stomach for a fight in BiH by being totally unwilling to commit ground forces that appeared 
necessary if the war were to be brought to a halt.138 However, in the first of a series of 
Presidential Review Directives (PRDs), Clinton asked his National Security Team139 in 
                                              
135 Quoted from President Bill Clinton, address titled “Liberal Internationalism: America and the Global Economy” delivered 
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Warren Christopher was selected as Secretary of State. Christopher had served as the Deputy to former Secretary of State 
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January, 1993 to review American policy toward the Balkans.140  According to Ivo Daalder, 
these five options were to be considered:141 
1. Using airpower to enforce the no-fly zone over BiH142 
2. Engaging in air strikes against Serb artillery positions and airfields 
3. Altering the UN arms embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims143 to obtain more 
weapons 
4. Establishing UN peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and Macedonia to prevent 
further spread of conflict in the region 
5. Creating an international war crimes commission to investigate reports of 
atrocities.  
 
None of the five options discussed by the Principals Committee144 included American “boots 
on the ground” in BiH. Vietnam was a distant but ever present ghost. President Clinton looked 
for ways to increase U.S. involvement without placing American lives at risk. However, it can 
be argued that Clinton initially briefly considered a more aggressive U.S. policy in BiH. 
However, a majority of Congress, the Department of State and Pentagon, as presented later, 
arrayed themselves in opposition to such a risky policy change. Consequently, the outcome of 
the review on U.S. policy towards the Balkans, presented by Secretary Christopher in 
February 1993 did not include any kind of military measures. Under no circumstances would 
U.S. ground troops be deployed to BiH. However, the United States participated in NATO’s 
Operation Deny Flight that took place for more than two and a half years.145 Ivo Daalder 
advocated that President Clinton’s unwillingness to involve ground forces left him with very 
limited options to obtain real influence; with the exception of trying to persuade European 
allies to influence the outcome on the ground in BiH.146 Subsequently, U.S. policy in BiH was 
tied to the UN and EU allies, which had an ineffective peacekeeping force on the ground. 
During the next two years, President Clinton tried several ways to escape the dilemmas caused 
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by consistently refusing to deploy troops. Postponement and avoidance of decision-making 
would eventually add up to failure as he ran into the “ceiling” of political courage and will.   
 The first international peace plan for BiH, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,147 
sought to balance the competing desires for ethnic autonomy between the three parties by 
dividing BiH into ten semi-autonomous regions.  Even if the EU supported the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan, President Clinton described the plan as “flawed” and initially decided not to 
endorse it.148 The problem with President Clinton’s rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan was 
that it placed the responsibility for the failure of these peace talks squarely on Clinton.  
Subsequently, the Clinton Administration announced that the U.S. would like to assist in 
modifications of the plan and would be willing to help enforce it. New negotiations meant 
putting more pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and getting the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims “on board.”  However, the “Serbian coalition army” refused to accept any peace plan 
and continued to stonewall all peace efforts; they followed their lessons identified - they 
achieved their objectives through use of force and by ignoring the international community. 
Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs continued their operations; in mid-March 1993 an attack was 
launched on the Muslim enclave in Srebrenica. When the Principles Committee on March 25, 
1993 once again discussed the latest developments in BiH, two policy options emerged: (1) 
increase military pressure against the Bosnian Serbs by lifting the arms embargo and by use of 
U.S. or NATO air strikes; (2) establish a cease-fire and protect the Muslim enclaves from 
Bosnian Serb assaults. These two policy options were similar to what candidate Clinton had 
argued in his presidential campaign.  However, none of these choices were particularly 
appealing for President Clinton, as they carried significant political costs and military risks.  
For international policy, President Clinton adopted a more traditional method of 
decision-making. In contrast to domestic affairs, he did not take a hands-on approach to 
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foreign policy. In foreign policy Clinton seemed to operate under broad guidelines, his 
national security team would formulate options and then brief the President for his approval or 
rejection. Observers noted that Clinton deferred decisions on what to do with BiH. He wanted 
more time to make up his mind, even if his advisors had narrowed the options to two. Geir 
Lundestad argued that at first President Clinton seemed to assume a position of a lack of 
interest in foreign affairs. To Clinton, the domestic issues were what counted and only those 
parts of foreign policy that directly affected the state of the American economy were to be 
given priority.149  William Hyland goes a step further when he argued that President Clinton 
made a nearly fatal decision by turning over his foreign policies to subordinates. Clinton had, 
according to Hyland, no strong conviction about what the American foreign policy should 
accomplish except to please voters. Clinton wanted to be informed, but his aids were warned 
not to take too much of the President’s time.150 David Halberstam claimed that Clinton’s 
interest in BiH became more distant, at best episodic.151 Derek Chollet argued that Clinton 
entered the spring of 1995 with an approach toward the conflict which he criticized as 
“unfocused, uninspired and unprincipled.”152 Even some of those closest to President Clinton 
seemed to chafe at the way he spent so much time making decisions.153 A possible explanation 
to Clinton’s approach can be found in his management and decision-making style. President 
Clinton used a seminar-type style of decision-making, a style which might give an appearance 
that the president was weak and distanced.154  Further on, Clinton’s thinking and debating 
seem to have been viewed as indecisiveness. His decision-making approach was sometime 
held up to ridicule because he allowed an openness of debate. In contrast to that 
characterization, Bill Clinton personally believed he was unusually decisive for a president.155 
The acquired reputation for indecisiveness had in Clinton’s belief, roots in people projecting 
their own anxieties and uncertainties onto him.156 
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 Finally after considerable delay, Clinton opted for a lift and strike policy.157  The 
objective of the lift and strike approach was to convince the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-
Owen plan.158  Clinton’s motivation for the lift and strike policy can be found in three major 
factors for considerations: (1) the costs of getting too involved in BiH would involve spending 
political capital needed on his domestic agenda; (2) Clinton’s fear of undermining the on-
going reform policies in Russia;159 and (3) avoiding a possible American military quagmire in 
BiH, ala Vietnam.160  Clinton’s decision to pursue the lift and strike strategy had a major 
catch; it needed European and Russian approval. The European allies rejected in early May 
1993 Clinton’s lift and strike policy arguing it would threaten the transatlantic relationship in 
NATO and would make the United States solely responsible for the challenges in BiH.161 
Consequently, a week later Clinton’s lift and strike policy was effectively dead.162  A new 
U.S. policy towards BiH was reached two weeks later when the United States, Britain, France, 
Russia and Spain agreed on a Joint Action Program.163 However, the Joint Action Program did 
                                              
157 The idea of the “lift and strike” policy was to lift the UNSC arms embargo in BiH in order to allow the poorly armed 
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not calm the situation on the ground. Appalled by images in the media and reports from his 
staff, President Clinton in July 1993 again asked for a new BiH approach. This time Clinton 
requested all possible options, including the use of U.S. ground forces.   
 On August 2, 1993, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed that NATO should make 
preparations for undertaking stronger measures including air strikes in BiH. The measures 
should be under authority of the UNSC and within the framework of UNSC Resolutions. Full 
coordination would be carried out with the UN, including appropriate arrangements between 
NATO military authorities and UNPROFOR.164 Close cooperation between the UN and 
NATO would legitimize the need for U.S.-led NATO missions of maintaining stability in 
Europe.  However, UNPROFOR proved powerless to protect civilians; its humanitarian 
mission dwindled to an effort to protect the humanitarian convoys. The NATO initiative 
became a new failure because of the UN-NATO restrictive agreement on air strikes. The UN 
Secretary General and NATO’s SACEUR165 each held one of two keys needed for an 
agreement. Consequently, NATO was not allowed to conduct air strikes on its own because of 
the “dual key” system under which UN and NATO had to agree before such military actions 
could be taken.166  Given dominant French and British roles in UNPROFOR, air strikes by 
NATO were vetoed to avoid Bosnian Serb repercussions. The preferred approach of the 
Clinton Administration; could not be executed as long as UNPROFOR troops were vulnerable 
to being taken hostage.167 Consequently, the dual key system proved to be a frustrating 
impediment to protecting the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Serb coalition army 
would once again capitalize on the Western reluctance to use its military “muscles”.  
With the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, President Clinton inherited what 
would turn out to be a disaster and a lesson learned during his first ten months in the White 
House. On May 4, 1993, the command of the U.S. forces in Somalia was quietly passed from 
the U.S.-led UNITAF operation to the second UN-led Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
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without any presidential or congressional complaints.168 During the upcoming months the 
situation in Somalia deteriorated. The Administration reluctantly approved sending a battalion 
of Rangers and a Delta Force unit. The television images on the evening of October 3, 1993 
showed the bodies of two U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu as 
Somalis kicked them and jeered. U.S. peace-keeping forces had become engaged in a major 
battle resulting in over 100 U.S. casualties. This experience severely influenced President 
Clinton’s policies concerning other peripheral humanitarian crises.169 Congress and the public 
grew increasingly uncomfortable with peace operations in general and the situation in Somalia 
in particular.170  How had a humanitarian mission turned into an obsession with getting 
Mohammad Farah Aideed? Why were American forces doing UN bidding?171  In his 
memoirs, Bill Clinton described the strong reactions from Senators Robert Byrd and John 
McCain, both demanding that the President should get the troops out of Somalia.172 Congress’ 
reaction was intense and furious to the October 3 “fire fight” in Mogadishu, and a large 
number of Congressional members called for immediate withdrawal. President Clinton 
ignored the critics from Congress and decided to keep reinforced U.S. forces in Somalia until 
March 31, 1994. Somalia, a country peripheral to United States interest, influenced President 
Clinton’s actions in the heart of Europe. Clinton became even more reluctant to deploy ground 
forces to BiH.173  Somalia was a tragedy for U.S. - UN relations.174 Clinton argued in his 
memoirs: “…I had to consider the consequences of any action that could make it even harder 
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require justifying involvement in terms of United States’ national interests and would limit situations in which American 
troops would serve under United Nation’s command.” The article is available at: www.nytimes.com  accessed April 12, 
2009.   
169 See Clinton, My Life, 554; Albright, Madam Secretary, 145-150 and Powell, My American Journey, 588. 
170 See President Clinton’s “Explaining Somalia to the Congress,” message delivered October 23, 1993. See also DiPrizio, 
Armed Humanitarians, 4.  
171 John R. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia” Foreign Affairs vol. 73, no 1 (1994): 55-66.  
172 Clinton, My Life, 551.  
173 Lessons were identified and learned in Somalia: President Clinton grew more weary of risking his “domestic capital” on 
military operations in states of peripheral interests to the United States. Clinton’s cautions would affect his responses in the 
Balkans and other humanitarian crisis such as the ethnic killings in Rwanda in 1994. Therefore, little consideration was given 
to sending U.S. Armed Forces to Rwanda when civil war and ethnic cleansing followed the death of Rwanda’s president. 
Nearly, four years later, during his travels to Rwanda, President Clinton accepted in remarks delivered to Rwanda 
government officials, genocide survivors and assistance workers at Kigali Airport on March 25, 1998, his share of 
responsibility for inaction in response to the ethnic killing of more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu during 90 days that 
began April 6 in 1994. See Clinton, My Life, 782; Albright, Madam Secretary, 152; and Halberstam, War in a time of peace, 
248-66. 
174 The Clinton Administration’s belief in multilateralism as directed through the UN blurred the Administration’s focus on 
genuine U.S. national interests. The relationship between the Clinton Administration and UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali would seriously deteriorate after Somalia. 
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to get Congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia....”175  Presidential 
Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was among Clinton Administration’s policy responses to the 
controversies over the UN-led multilateral peace operation in Somalia. PDD-25 offers this 
conclusion: 
Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance 
American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The 
U.S. cannot be the world’s policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in 
armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority 
in some states-crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. 
interests.176 
Madeleine Albright argued that the purpose of PDD-25 was to put America squarely on the 
side of strengthening UN peacekeeping operations. The chain of command between the 
United States and the UN should be made clearer; missions should have a clear mandate and 
significant consultations with Congress were required.177  On, the other hand, Republicans in 
Congress dismissed PDD-25 because the document in their view continued to subordinate the 
U.S. to the UN.178  
In February 1994, a modified plan for BiH was developed to apply more pressure on 
the Serbs. The U.S. finally decided to become actively more involved in the diplomatic 
negotiations in BiH and stimulated NATO’s willingness to implement air strikes.179 A 
possible Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat alliance was pushed to improve the military balance 
between the parties on the ground in BiH.180 An agreement called “the Washington 
Agreement” was stuck in Washington D.C. on March 18, 1994.  President Clinton had 
achieved his first successful initiative in BiH.181  A new five-nation negotiating forum, the 
Contact Group, was formed. Russia became a welcomed major actor in diplomacy in BiH 
because this increased access and leverage over the Serb leadership in Belgrade and Pale.  For 
the Clinton Administration, the establishment of the Contact Group made it possible to forge 
                                              
175 Quoted from Clinton, My Life, 552. 
176 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) presented on May 6, 1994. Quote is from the conclusions 
in this document. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm accessed January 20, 2009.      
177Albright, Madam Secretary, 147.  
178 William Hyland claims PDD-25 restated a version of traditional foreign policy where peacekeeping should henceforth be 
measured by U.S. interests; and for operations involving substantial use of force, U.S. participation would require a clear 
commitment to win. See Hyland, Clintons World, 64. If one compares the six major tests in the Weinberger Doctrine with 
PDD-25, it becomes clear that those six tests were woven into the policy of PDD-25.  
179 President Clinton, Remarks delivered at the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Brussels, on Janaury 
10, 1994.  
180 The Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat conflict in 1993 and 1994 had left the Bosnian Serbs with a decisive military 
advantage.  
181 With the “Washington Agreement,” the Clinton Administration succeeded in isolating the third party, the Bosnian Serbs in 
the negotiations. See Clinton, My Life, 590-91. 
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greater international unity and avoid the UN system.182  The “dual key” restrictions in BiH 
and the experiences from the UN-led UNOSOM II Operation in Somalia had made President 
Clinton more than reluctant to involve the UN in future operations. Clinton wanted the UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali completely eliminated from the chain of command.183 
Consequently, in BiH the NATO and UN cooperation would be on a hold in the summer of 
1995 after the genocide in Srebrenica.184   
In November 1994, Clinton’s Democratic Party suffered a stunning electoral defeat in 
the mid-term election and lost both houses of Congress to the Republicans. The Republican 
Party had long favored lifting the arms-embargo in BiH, unilaterally if necessary.185  
Subsequently, on November 10, President Clinton announced that the United States would no 
longer enforce the arms embargo.186  President Clinton’s credibility came under strong 
pressure from NATO allies who had “boots on the ground” in UNPROFOR. How could he, 
who did not share the risk of having troops in BiH, unilaterally lift the arms embargo?  
Further transatlantic disagreements occurred when the Bosnian Serbs responded to U.S-led 
NATO air strikes by detaining several hundred UN peacekeepers vulnerable to Bosnian Serb 
retaliation.187 NATO looked weak, and as the senior partner in NATO, the U.S. was looking 
weaker. The differences within NATO over which policy should be followed with regard to 
BiH, which surfaced at the end of 1994, were the worst in NATO since the Suez crises in 
1956.188  What had worked in Iraq during Desert Storm became a dismal failure in BiH. The 
                                              
182 The Clinton Administration’s wish to avoid UN was a major change in policy from the statement made at the 
Confirmation Hearing of Madeleine Albright for the post as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations where she stated: “When 
the President announced my appointment last month, he said that, in his Administration, the post of Ambassador to the 
United Nations will be one of the most critical foreign policy positions. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations is 
poised to play a central and positive role for peace.” Source: Quote from “Statement at Confirmation Hearing of Ambassador 
to the United Nations.” January 21, 1993, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no 15, April 12, 1993. See 
also Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 30-35 on disagreements between UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali and the Clinton Administration on the UN civilian decision-making authorities over airstrikes.  
183 See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 33. See also Holbrooke, To End a War, 103 and 202. Holbrooke argued that 
the struggle over UN’s role foreshadowed the United States determination to later oppose Boutros-Ghali’s quest for a second 
term as Secretary General. Kofi Annan’s performance to end the dual key problem influenced the Clinton Administration’s 
support for Annan a year later as the successor of Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the UN.  
184 The Srebrenica Genocide took place in July 1995, killing estimated 7-8,000 Bosnian Muslim boys and men in the 
Srebrenica area by paramilitary units of the Bosnian Serb Army under command of General Ratko Mladić. Paramilitary units 
from Serbia also participated in these genocides. The UN had declared Srebrenica an UN-protected "safe area", but that did 
not prevent the genocides, even though 400 Dutch UN peacekeepers were present.  See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 66-68; 
and Clinton, My Life, 665-666.  
185 Woodward, The Choice, 255. The Republican majority in Congress was behind Senate majority leader Bob Dole when he 
wanted the U.S. to break with the UN and unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.  
186 See Clinton, My Life, 633. 
187 See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 8; and Wesley K Clark, with Tom Carhart, A Time to Lead: For Duty, 
Honor and Country (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 177-78. 
188 See Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance, 116-21; and Halberstam, War in a Time of 
Peace, 285. 
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transatlantic allies’ inability to act in harmony undermined NATO’s role in Europe and U.S. 
leadership in NATO. President Clinton’s BiH policy ended the year 1994 basically where it 
had started: without a diplomatic initiative, without a threat of using massive military forces, 
and without credibility for the United States as the lead nation in NATO.   
Again, President Clinton had to make a real choice: either go ahead with unilateral air 
strikes in support of Bosnian Muslims to defend UN “safe areas” with the possible 
consequences that NATO allies would withdraw from BiH; or abandon further air strikes with 
the possible cost of a Bosnian Serb military victory. For President Clinton, the choice seemed 
to have been simple; he decided to put NATO unity first and refrained from a unilateral lifting 
of the arms embargo.189 By this move, President Clinton’s policy towards BiH shifted from 
intervention to containment. However, to improve the transatlantic relationships, Clinton on 
December 7, 1994 decided to offer up to 25,000 U.S. troops to help extricate, if necessary, UN 
peacekeepers from BiH. Clinton’s offer seemed to have three objectives: (1) give an incentive 
to allies that had troops in UNPROFOR to keep their forces in BiH; (2) send a message that 
U.S. forces would be deployed to handle an eventual worst case extradition of UNPROFOR; 
and (3) demonstrate U.S. leadership in NATO and keep NATO as a transatlantic alliance 
relevant.190  Three months later, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formally 
requested NATO to prepare for a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal.191 Thus, President 
Clinton’s promise to provide troops became an uneasy commitment when the fighting 
throughout BiH continued and NATO airpower was “checkmated” by the Bosnian Serbs’ 
hostage-taking.  President Clinton faced critical dilemmas; first, how would a deployment of 
up to 25,000 troops to BiH, in a context of defeat, influence his political capital?  Secondly, 
what if BiH became the Vietnam-like quagmire feared by the Pentagon?192 Thirdly, how to 
avoid a pullout or collapse of UNPROFOR, which would obligate the U.S. to live up its 
                                              
189 See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 4. 
190 President Clinton conditioned this offer of 25,000 troops on the understanding that an extradition operation would be 
under sole NATO command. This meant no “dual key” arrangements with the UN. See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 47. 
General Wesley Clark argued that the American willingness to commit ground troops was the decisive factor in winning 
European support. See Clark, Waging Modern War, 52.   
191 See Report of the UN General Secretary to the UN Security Council March 22, 1995 (S/1995/222). Quote from Para 79,  
22-23: “In an exchange of correspondence with the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, I have made it clear that, 
…it would be of great value to the UN to be able to call on the services of NATO, with the approval of the Security Council, 
to protect and if necessary conduct a withdrawal operation.” Quotes available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/secu95.htm 
accessed in April 12, 2009. See Woodward, the Choice, 256-57; and Chollet, the Road to the Dayton Accords, 9. See also 
UNSC Resolution 982 (March 29, 1995) which extended UNPROFOR's mandate in BiH for an additional period terminating 
on November 30, 1995.   
192 It should be noted that BiH was a country that was heavily mined, is mostly mountainous terrain, and has poor roads, big 
rivers and valleys which would make a military operation a very risky and dangerous undertaking. From a logistical point of 
view support in such rugged terrain is a huge challenge.  
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commitment?  Fourthly, what impact would action or inaction have on the upcoming 1996 
presidential election?   
Almost “heaven-sent” for Clinton’s political capital was the French193 proposal of 
establishing a 10,000-man multinational Rapid Reaction Force with troops from France, 
Britain and the Netherlands, and which was successfully organized and deployed to BiH in 
early July 1995.194  Consequently, Clinton fully supported this deployment, even if Congress 
were reluctant to support the logistical support he committed.195  However, U.S leadership in 
NATO seemed to still be in jeopardy. President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to NATO 
in a speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs: 
We believe still that a strengthened United Nations operation is the best 
insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster should they leave. We 
have a longstanding commitment to help our NATO allies, some of whom have 
troops in the U.N. operation in Bosnia, to take part in a NATO operation to 
assist them in a withdrawal if that should ever become necessary. And so, if 
necessary, and after consultation with Congress, I believe we should be 
prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations 
troops for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its 
forces.196 
Clinton’s statement was vague regarding a temporary deployment of U.S. forces to BiH. How 
should “reconfiguration and strengthening” of the UN troops be interpreted? Was this an 
attempt to reassure a reluctant Congress?  Or had Clinton decided to deploy forces as he had 
promised NATO allies on December 7, 1994?  Or was President Clinton again distancing 
himself from deploying ground forces?  Congress raised several critical voices on Clinton’s 
vague speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy.197  Consequently, President Clinton addressed 
the issue again to avoid further misinterpretations: 
                                              
193 It should be noted that French policy toward the crisis at the Balkans became more aggressive when Jacques Chirac took 
over as President of France from President Francois Mitterrand on May 17, 1995. Chirac was especially upset by how French 
troops were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs and the French troop’s passivity in a moment of crisis. See Halberstam, War 
in a Time of Peace, 303.   
194 The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was endorsed by the Contact Group in May 1995, by NATO on June 3 and by the UN 
Security Council on June 16. The U.S. would provide intelligence and logistical support. Source: Hearing before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 104th Congress, first session, June 7, 1995. Available at: 
http://www.archive.org/details/situationinbosni1996unit Accessed March, 2, 2009. However, it should be noted that this 
reinforcement on the ground came too late to alter the image of weakness of the UN. See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 163.                 
195 See article written by Elaine Sciolino, “Money for New U.N. Force: Congress Is Key for Clinton,” in The New York Times 
on June 15, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 12, 2009.  
196 Quote from speech by President Clinton at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs on May 31, 1995. Available at: 
http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/Publications/html/afacad.html accessed April 22, 2009.  
197 Senator Jessie Helms (Rep, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee), said he would not object if the U.S. helped 
evacuate UN troops. But of the involvement of American forces for any other purpose, Helms declared: “Not on my watch.”  
Representative J.D. Hayworth (Rep, AZ) advocated: “My constituents, who are among the most conservative, are not neo-
isolationists but practical, and their question is: Where is our national interest?”  Newt Gingrich (Rep, Speaker of the House) 
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I determined that we certainly should not have ground forces there, not as a part 
of the military conflict nor as a part of the United Nations peacekeeping 
mission…If our allies decide to stay, we want to support them, but within the very 
careful limits I have outlined. I want to make it clear again what I have said about 
our ground forces. We will use them only if, first there is a genuine peace with no 
shooting and no fighting and the United States is part of policing that peace… 
The question has been raised about whether we would help them to withdraw as a 
last resort. I have decided that if a U.N. unit needs an emergency extraction, we 
would assist after consulting with Congress. This would be a limited, temporary 
operation, and we have not been asked to do this. I think it is highly unlikely that 
we would be asked to do it.198 
Despite these finely tuned caveats, President Clinton’s statements were widely interpreted as a 
change in strategy. His clarifications in his radio address resolved the confusion and quieted 
the criticism from Congress.  
Once again, events on the ground outpaced Clinton’s deliberations and his policy 
reached a dead end. The Srebrenica genocide in July 1995 became the turning point in BiH. 
President Clinton was boxed-in by the following: (1) His commitment to deploy forces to a 
NATO evacuation operation, if the UN decided to leave BiH; (2) his unwillingness to put 
forces on the ground in BiH; (3) the need to find the morally correct route; (4) the hostile 
Congress; and (5) his foreign policy records when a presidential election year was 
approaching. BiH’s future and the credibility of Clinton’s foreign policy record were 
inextricably linked. Consequently, giving up BiH was not an option. It was also unthinkable to 
abandon NATO.199  President Clinton recognized, although Congress and the American 
people still would not support it, that the U.S. could no longer avoid involvement. 
Consequently, the President needed an “endgame” policy that would get him out of the “box” 
into which he had been squeezed. According to Bob Woodward, a frustrated200 President 
Clinton demanded: “We need to get the policy straight or we’re just going to be kicking the 
can down the road again. Right now we’ve got a situation; we’ve got no clear mission, no 
one’s in control of events.”201  Several attempts to develop a workable policy towards BiH 
                                                                                                                                             
said: “It’s very important for us to be very cautious.” Representative Richard A Gephardt (Dem, The minority leader) argued: 
“I would reserve judgment on providing limited troops for other purposes until he saw a specific proposal from NATO.”  
Quoted in article by Katharine Q. Seelye: “Conflict in the Balkans: Capitol Hill: Many in Congress Reluctant to widen U.S. 
Role in Bosnia,” New York Times, June 2, 1995. Available at: www.nytimes.com accessed March 12, 2009.                                                
198 Presidential Radio Address held by President Clinton on June 3, 1995. The address is available at: 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Presidential_Radio_Address_-_3_June_1995 accessed March 12, 2009.  
199  See Woodward, The Choice, 257.  
200 Bob Woodward described how President Clinton “…erupts in several of his celebrated private blowups, his large body 
shaking and his voice bellowing.” Quoted in Woodward, The Choice, 254. See also Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 204.  
201 Quoted in Woodward, The Choice, 255.  
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had failed.202  Clinton’s failed policies made the U.S. look weak and were damaging its 
standing in the world. At each critical policy juncture, President Clinton had pulled back and 
deferred to European allies’ wishes; including halting pressure for using air power against the 
Bosnian Serbs. Clinton would finally reverse years of indecision by setting a final policy 
direction, which would follow a path that two successive Administrations had sought to avoid.  
It included that the United States seized primary responsibility for BiH’s destiny from the UN 
and the European allies and finally submitted to the reality on the ground in BiH. Engagement 
had to prevail over the containment strategy.203  The process towards the “BiH endgame 
strategy” started; the Administration’s new focus was through diplomacy and balancing 
“carrots and sticks” getting the Serbian President Slobodan Milosević “onboard” by offering 
relief from sanctions he had long sought. To get a political settlement in 1995, the U.S. would 
have to take the lead in the negotiations, as it had done when brokering the Federation 
agreement204 and the Contact Group Plan.205  In the summer of 1995 the Clinton 
Administration worked out what should be called the “Endgame Strategy.” After 
comprehensive discussions within his Administration, President Clinton decided that the new 
U.S. initiative should comprise these points, once UNPROFOR was withdrawn from BiH:206 
 A comprehensive peace settlement based on the core principles of the Contact Group 
plan, included a united BiH; 
 Three-way recognition among the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and BiH; 
 Consideration of changes in the Contact Group map to take account of recent 
territorial changes and to ensure viable and defensible borders; 
 A reaffirmation of support for the Contact Group plan agreed in June 1994, dividing 
BiH into two entities, 51 percent of the territory to the Croat-Muslim Federation and 
49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. 
 Sanctions relief for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the suspension of 
sanctions once an agreement was signed and complete lifting of sanctions once the 
agreement was implemented; and 
 A comprehensive plan for regional economic integration, to be assisted through an 
international “mini-Marshall” plan. 
                                              
202 Despite some U.S. successes in forging NATO consensus on a more assertive policy toward BiH, including some air 
attacks to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and to support UNPROFOR most efforts ended in failure. U.S. led-NATO air attacks 
took place from 1993 to 1995.  
203 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (1995). President Clinton wrote in the 
preface of this strategy: “We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be 
carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities.”   
204 Agreement established between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Washington D.C. March 18, 1994.  
205 See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 103. 
206 Ibid, 112-13; and Holbrooke, To End a War, 74. 
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If the negotiation plan presented failed, the U.S. would follow this approach after 
UNPROFOR had been withdrawn:207 
 Seek to end the arms embargo multi-laterally, through the vote of the UNSC; 
 Provide arms, training and support to the Bosnian Muslims208 in order to assist  
establishing a military balance on the ground; 
 Enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air-strikes for a nine month transition period in 
case the Bosnian Serbs attacked; and  
 Encourage the presence of a multinational force to assist the Bosnian Muslims in 
defending their territory. 
The European allies and Russia mostly embraced President Clinton’s plan of action.209 Even if 
there was minor disagreement over some of the issues of arming and training the Bosnian 
Muslim Army, the most important fact was that the United States’ now took the lead to end 
the war in BiH. The next step for the Clinton Administration was to appoint a White House 
envoy to lead the negotiations with the intransigent parties in the Balkans. Assistant Secretary 
of State, Richard Holbrooke, was selected.210 After weeks of negotiations in the Balkan 
capitals, Holbrooke and his team211 achieved the wanted breakthroughs. When the Bosnian 
Serbs launched212 a new devastating mortar attack upon a Sarajevo marketplace in late August 
1995 NATO began to bomb Bosnian Serb positions.213  For the first time, negotiators in BiH 
had massive NATO air power muscles behind them.214  Holbrooke and his team capitalized on 
                                              
207 Ibid, 113. See also President Clinton’s statement: “Veto of Lifting of Bosnia Arms Embargo,” White House, August 11, 
1995.  
208 This support was predicated on cooperative attitude during negotiations. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 113.  
209 Christopher, In the Stream of History, 349 
210 Richard Holbrooke was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from 1994 through 1996, 
during which time he led the BiH peace talks, which resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. At the start of the Clinton 
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211 It should be noted that three team members (Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Kruzel, Ambassador Robert 
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in 1999. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 3-18; Christopher, In the Stream of History, 350; Clinton, My Life, 668-69; and 
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212 The source of the mortar round that exploded in the central market in Sarajevo is disputed. Serb unit commanders claim 
they did not fire it, but it was generally believed by the U.S. and NATO forces that Serbs were to be blamed for the explosion 
killing 68 people.  
213 After the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995, sixteen nations and senior UN representatives met for a conference in 
London to consider new options on BiH. As a result of this “London Conference” UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali gave 
the UN commander in BiH (General Bernard Janvier) the authority to request NATO air strikes without consulting civilian 
UN officials. The participants agreed in principle to use large scale NATO air strikes in response to eventual Bosnian Serb 
aggression. Consequently, on August 30, 1995, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force with large scale attacks on Serb 
targets. See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 129-32; Woodward, The Choice,  270; Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 327; and 
Clinton, My Life, 666.  
214 See Christopher, In the Stream of History, 350. It should be noted that the climate for negotiations shifted dramatically 
during September 1995, due to the Croatian offensive that significantly reduced Bosnian Serb territorial holdings, NATO’s 
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this situation and brought the three parties215 together at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
outside Dayton, Ohio in October 1995. On November 21, the three warring parties in BiH 
initialed an agreement incorporating all the goals pushed forward by U.S. Secretary of State 
Christopher.216  BiH showed both the promise and the limits of coercive diplomacy. Whether 
diplomacy in BiH could have succeeded without the robust use of military force217 is hard to 
know. However, the Dayton Agreement finally brought a peaceful solution in BiH.218  In a 
televised address to the nation on November 27, 1995 President Clinton explained his 
decision to finally deploy ground troops to BiH.219   
3.2 Approaches of the President’s staff and advisors  
Traditional political-military policy was obviously downgraded, in President Clinton’s 
first term. In short, when the national security team entered the White House there was 
intellectual confusion over the nature of the post-Cold War era and what the objectives and 
means of the U.S. foreign policy should be.220 Within a few months, the Clinton 
Administration’s BiH policy had evolved from tough talk to a hands-off approach. For more 
than two years BiH was a defining issue for Clinton’s national security team’s struggles 
illustrated by its internal disagreements, uncertainties and degree of ambivalence regarding 
how to move forward to prove America’s global leadership as envisioned.  
                                                                                                                                             
ongoing bombing campaign and Slobodan Milosević’s decision to seize control of the peace negotiations. The Croat Army’s 
military operations that took place in September destroyed the Bosnian Serb’s perceived invincibility.  
215 President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats; President in BiH, Alija Izetbegović the Bosnian 
Muslims and President of Serbia Slobodan Milosević the Bosnian Serbs. Milosević had coerced the Bosnian Serbs into giving 
him authority to negotiate in Dayton on their behalf. Due to the specific nature of the conflict in BiH it was necessary to 
include all these three presidents as key participants at Dayton. See Christopher, In the Stream of History, 348-55.  
216 The course of events during the negotiations is now well known, not least because several people present have authored its 
history in fascinating detail. See: Richard Holbrooke, To End a War; and Christopher, In the Stream of History, 351-59. 
217 The use of force here was NATO from the air and the Croatian Army on the ground.  
218 See “Summary of General Framework Agreement.” This is a fact sheet released by Office of the Spokesman the U.S. 
Department of State on November 30, 1995. Available at:  http://www.nato.int/IFOR/gfa/gfa-summ.htm   accessed April 18, 
2009. On December 14, 1995 the General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed in Paris. To support the 
implementation of the Peace Agreement achieved at Dayton, NATO launched (based on UNSC Resolution 1031) the largest 
military operation ever undertaken by the NATO. The Implementation Force (IFOR) started its mission in BiH on December 
20, 1995. The U.S. deployed 20,000 troops as part of the IFOR (60,000 troops) to keep the peace.  
219 See speech by President Clinton. “The Dayton Accords: Imposing Peace for Bosnia.” The White House, November 27, 
1995. President Clinton used the words: “Risks to our troops will be minimized.” “By making an overwhelming show of 
force, they will lessen the need to use force.”  “And I ask all American, and I ask every Member of Congress.” “Our Joint 
Chiefs of Staff has concluded that this mission should and will take about one year.”  The observant reader will see that all 
requirements in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine were met by these words in Clinton’s speech.  
220 In his memoirs Bill Clinton wrote “…in the critical early months, both the staff and I would do a lot on the-the job 
learning, and some of the lessons would prove to be quite costly.” Quoted in Clinton, My Life, 467-68.  
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Evidence suggests that President Clinton’s staff and advisors were split in their view 
how to handle BiH and whether or not to use force.221 The foreign policy team would for more 
than two years struggle over interests and beliefs on how to best to handle U.S. interests to 
solve the crisis in BiH.222 Even though the foreign policy team was split, it understood that 
U.S. policy had implications beyond BiH; the outcome would shape United States relationship 
with Europe, Russia, the UN and NATO.  The internal debates in the team oscillated between 
arguments for and against engagement and for and against the use of military force. One the 
one side the “hawks” consisting of Vice-president Al Gore, UN Ambassador Madeleine 
Albright and the National Security Advisor Anthony Lake all advocated stronger U.S. 
engagement and if necessary the use of military force to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the 
negotiation table. However, Albright was the only principal to advocate in favor of ground 
troops.223  On the other hand the “doves,” consisting of Secretary Warren Christopher,224 
Secretary Les Aspin (replaced by Secretary William Perry on February 3, 1994) and the CJCS 
Colin Powell (replaced by General John Shalikashvili on September 30, 1993225) were all 
opposed to the use of U.S. ground forces in BiH.226 Especially, General Colin Powell was 
opposed to American military involvement. However, the “doves” accepted an alternative to 
deploying “boots on the ground;” the use of air power to stop the Bosnian Serbs if used to 
support or enforce diplomacy. The many months of debate among Clinton’s advisers also 
brought up another key issue; should the United States favor a multilateral or unilateral 
approach when threatening use of air power? Secretary Christopher, in particular, hesitated 
about having to get NATO allies on board.227 Subsequently, in the absence of a consensus 
among the President’s advisers, most of the discussed approaches reached virtual dead ends. 
Clinton, on several occasions was infuriated over his foreign policy team’s “helplessness.” 
However, in the late spring of 1995, the internal positions on BiH were changing. 
Consequently, President Clinton deferred a final decision on what to do until August 1995, 
                                              
221 See The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” (1995), ii. Qoute from this 
strategy: “We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake.” 
222 See Albright, Madam Secretary, 180; and Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 165 
223 See Drew, On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency, 274-75. 
224 Halberstam argued Christopher was somewhere near the center between hawks and doves, perhaps slightly on the dovish 
side. See Halberstam, War in a time of peace, 226.  
225 General John Shalikashvili was SACEUR when he was selected as Powell’s successor as CJCS in 1993. Consequently, 
Shalikashvili had great knowledge about European allies and the situation in BiH.  
226 See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 13. 
227 Ibid, 21. 
  
55
when based on advice from his advisers; he decided that the U.S. should take a stronger hand, 
diplomatically and militarily.  
Al Gore, according to Bob Woodward, was President Clinton’s most important 
discussion partner.228  Al Gore was a hawk on BiH urging strong action to stop the conflict.229 
Halberstam advocated that when Gore pushed for a tougher line in the Balkans, President 
Clinton seemed responsive.230 Gore kept BiH on the agenda. However, he was caught in the 
classical limitations of being Vice President and would not embarrass Clinton. Albright stated 
“Gore was an advocate for a forceful action.”231 According to Woodward, at a meeting in June 
1995 Gore argued that the Administration’s inaction on BiH “is driving us into a brick wall 
with Congress.”232 In mid-July 1995, Gore once again went on the offensive over intelligence 
information provided from BiH by advocating: “We have to come up with something practical 
to make military sense. Acquiescence is not an option.”233 The President responded to Gore’s 
arguments by saying: “The United States can not be a punching bag in the world anymore.”234 
From the beginning of the Clinton Administration, Madeleine Albright, the UN 
Ambassador, was the most vocal and persistent advocate for a strong U.S. action in BiH, but 
her influence was also limited.235 It should be noted that Albright had a personal affection for 
Yugoslavia.236  For almost three years, she pushed for a strong approach with the use of 
military force to stop Bosnian Serb aggressions. Albright’s position was that America, for 
political and moral reasons, should not be bystanders while Bosnian Serb aggression went 
unchecked. Force should be used to stop aggression, this included if necessary ground forces. 
Albright challenged General Colin Powell by asking; “What’s the point of having this superb 
military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”237  The ease with which Albright 
was willing to deploy troops to BiH, some observers thought, was because among her peers in 
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the Administration, she was the individual least affected by Vietnam. She strongly warned 
President Clinton of the dire consequences to his Europe policy and the credibility of NATO 
and UN. From the beginning of the Clinton Administration she urged him to use airpower to 
slow Bosnian Serb advances.238 In the Clinton Administration’s first term, Albright’s 
persistent arguments for stronger actions with use of military force in BiH was not until July 
1995 adopted as a policy approach to follow. Albright was a hawk on BiH from the start, but 
she seemed not been taken seriously by her peers.239  
The Department of State’s position on BiH was that military force should only be 
deployed to help implement and enforce a negotiated settlement between the parties in BiH.240  
Secretary Warren Christopher position was that the U.S. should act alone only when vital 
national interests were at stake. The crisis in BiH did not meet such a prerequisite. 
Consequently, the bottom line was that President Clinton’s main priority should be to avoid a 
military ground presence in BiH.241  Secretary Christopher242 in many ways the elder 
statesman of Clinton’s Administration described the situation in BiH as “the problem from 
hell.”243  In a hearing before the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Secretary Christopher said: 
The United States will not send ground troops into Bosnia to engage in 
military action. As I said, we are prepared to commit our military forces to 
implement a peace settlement entered into consensually and in good faith by 
the parties, but we will not use our military forces to impose a settlement in 
the Balkans.244 
Secretary Christopher was deeply embarrassed in early May 1993, when he failed to 
persuade the European allies to adopt the more aggressive lift and strike policy.245 
Christopher’s journey to Europe was immensely damaging to the Clinton Administration and 
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particularly to Christopher himself. A few months later Christopher again was embarrassed 
after twelve U.S. Department of State officers revolted, sending the Secretary an 
“impassioned” letter claiming that diplomacy in BiH had failed and calling for firm military 
action.246 The New York Times wrote “not since the Vietnam War has a policy caused so 
much anguish within the foreign service.”247 Christopher became the perfect target for blame 
for critics of the Clinton policies in the Balkans. Halberstam’s characteristic of Christopher 
was: “as a weak man personally, who was bearing a weak policy from a weak 
Administration.”248 Albright argued “Secretary Christopher had trouble identifying any option 
he could recommend.”249 At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
February 24, 1994, Secretary Christopher said that the U.S. had important strategic, political 
and humanitarian interests in bringing peace to BiH. This testimony contrasted with 
Christopher’s remarks before the same committee in November 1993, when he had dismissed 
the crisis in Bosnia as “a difficult situation that had gone exactly as the U.S. had planned.”250 
The contradiction between the Administration’s policy speeches and U.S. actions hung over 
the Department of State like an immense cloud.251  The Department of State simply fell back 
on a mixture of diplomatic and humanitarian approaches. Christopher’s fundamental approach 
to BiH was that the crisis in BiH should primarily be reviewed as a conflict the Europeans 
should solve diplomatically, with America distancing itself from getting too deeply involved. 
Christopher’s view was that European allies and Congress would never support an increased 
U.S. military engagement in BiH. In an address at Harvard University in January 1995, 
Secretary Christopher outlined the four core principles for American Foreign Policy: (1) 
Maintaining American leadership; (2) strengthening cooperative relations with the world’s 
most powerful nations; (3) adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and 
security cooperation; and (4) continue to support democracy and human rights.252 In this 
address, Secretary Christopher gave the Department of State’s updated position on how to 
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solve the crisis in BiH by arguing “…we are seeking a negotiated solution in Bosnia because 
only a negotiated solution has any chance of lasting and preventing a wider war. What we 
must not do is make the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo.”253 
Christopher feared that European allies might respond to a push for U.S. forces by pulling out 
their own UNPROFOR troops, thus triggering a request for U.S. military support in a 
withdrawal operation. The Department of State seemed to have accepted stronger U.S. action 
with the use of massive airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs after they became aware of the 
genocide in Srebrenica in mid July 1995.254 From mid July also Christopher would advocate 
the need to use force against the Bosnian Serbs to reach a negotiated settlement to end the 
crisis in BiH.  
The Department of Defense and the CJCS had no enthusiasm for commitment of U.S. 
ground troops to force a settlement in BiH. Memories of Vietnam were still present in military 
circles. General Powell followed the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and denigrated the 
effectiveness of air power and other limited forms of military force on the ground.255  The 
Pentagon256 was adamantly against a military intervention, citing the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine that any use of force should be consistent with the doctrine of using overwhelming 
force to achieve clear political objectives. Evidence shows that the Pentagon was listened to 
seriously because General Colin Powell was unquestionably the single most respected and 
influential member of Clinton’s national security team.257  When military planners looked at 
BiH, experience had taught them that they could not think in terms of airpower alone. U.S. 
military forces could not do much without commitment, very strong ground and air forces, 
something far beyond what would be supportable in Congress and by the public. Air power 
alone could not prevail in the Balkan terrain, only troops on the ground could change Serb 
behavior.258 Powell’s constant unwelcome message at the meetings on BiH was that the 
United States should not commit forces until a clear political objective was defined. Secretary 
Les Aspin shared this view. General Shalikashvili was, like his predecessor Powell, disdainful 
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of those who believed all that was needed was to unleash U.S. airpower in a military 
operation. Shalikashvili’s view was that the idea of sole use of airpower was put forward by 
civilians who had no knowledge of how complicated it is to coordinate airpower without 
ground troops.259 Halberstam argued that the appointment of Les Aspin as Secretary of 
Defense in many ways was a disaster; unacceptable for the country and the Administration 
and heartbreaking for Les Aspin.260 Somehow the relationship between President Clinton and 
Secretary Aspin never worked. Consequently, he was replaced in late 1993 after the 
catastrophic events in Somalia. In her memoirs, Madeleine Albright said; “Aspin seemed torn 
between his interventionist instincts and the military reluctance to get involved.”261  Secretary 
Aspin’s replacement, Defense Secretary William Perry understood how the Pentagon worked 
and he was “up to speed” from the start.262  Perry was ready to use U.S. airpower, but his 
views coincided with those of the uniformed chiefs. Subsequently, Perry believed that lift and 
strike was an incomplete policy, temping because it was warfare on the cheap, but full of 
vulnerabilities. However, Srebrenica changed the opinion of the Pentagon as it changed the 
rest of the foreign policy team. Consequently, at the London Conference in July 1995, Perry 
and Shalikashvili managed to convince UN and European allies that the key to success would 
be massive high-technology bombing of Bosnian Serb targets. 263  
The relationship between James Woolsey, head of the CIA and President Clinton never 
worked.264 The world had changed and Clinton found the CIA far less important than his 
predecessor. Woolsey tried to get President Clinton’s attention but didn’t succeed. Available 
sources have not presented Woolsey’s view or inputs on how to solve the crises in BiH. 
Neither has Woolsey’s successor; John Deutch’s views been presented.265  However, Anthony 
Lake, the National Security Advisor, was one of the “hawks” on BiH policy.266 After more 
than two years of frustration by some of his colleagues’ indecision on what to do with BiH, 
Lake came up with the beginning of an endgame policy that would help end the White 
                                              
259 See Halberstam, War in a time of Peace,  326 
260 See Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 191 and 244-246. See also Powell, My American Journey, 563, 578. Holbrooke 
argues Les Aspin was forced out as Secretary of Defense, see Holbrooke, To End a War, 56. 
261 Quoted in Albright, Madam Secretary, 180. 
262 Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 328. 
263 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 70-72. 
264 See Halberstam, War in a time of peace, 243-44.  
265 John Deutch was in May 1995 sworn in as Director of CIA. He served until December 1996. He was replaced by George 
John Tenet.  
266 See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 20; and Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 167-68. 
  
60
House’s drift.267  In the Clinton Administration’s first year, Lake had argued the need for 
lowering barriers to humanitarian interventions: 
Where we can make a difference, we should not oppose using our military 
forces for humanitarian purposes simply because these missions do not 
resemble major wars for control of territory. Such missions will never be 
without risk, but as in all other aspects of our security policy, our military 
leadership is willing to accept reasonable risks in the service of our national 
objectives.268 
In this address, Lake argued that the strategy of “enlargement” of democracies would replace 
the doctrine of containment of communism. Lake elevated abstract moral and ethical concepts 
to the same level as national security interests. Morality would be the broad rationale for 
interventions. Lake wrote, according to Bob Woodward, a confidential letter to President 
Clinton arguing that “the Administrations’ weak, muddle through strategy” in BiH was 
becoming a cancer on Clinton’s entire foreign policy, spreading and eating away at its 
credibility.269 However, Anthony Lake, who was supposed to be managing the interagency 
deliberation of the policy on BiH, seemed to lose control of the processes. It was probably in 
this context that Lake, in June 1995, decided that he should try to come up with a policy 
proposal that broke from the established mind set. Lake called his approach the “Endgame 
Strategy.”270 Among the thoughts brought up was how to rule out that fact that the Europeans 
could block U.S. policy because of the threat posed to their UN ground troops. The U.S. 
would start doing what it had shirked doing for so long, exert its leadership. Lake presented 
his ideas to President Clinton, who showed immediate interest and told Lake to go ahead. 
Lake requested his top colleagues; Christopher, Perry, Albright, and Shalikashvili to produce 
comparable papers on where the policy on BiH ought to be in six months. Albright was still 
urging for use of force while both State and the Pentagon believed in containment. However, 
the latter views changed when the knowledge of what had happened in Srebrenica became 
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known. Once the Endgame strategy was agreed upon and President Clinton was fully 
committed to it, it was presented to European allies.271   
3.3 Congress  
 For more than two-hundred years, Congress and Presidents have wrestled over who 
has the final authority to send forces where battles threaten. The executive is the chief 
architect of U.S. foreign policy and therefore he has the primary responsibility to initiate 
consultations with Congress.272 However, the founders’ delegated important foreign policy 
powers to Congress so that would play a major role in the protection of U.S. vital interests. In 
the Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy document, presented in February 
1995, President Clinton wrote: 
 The full participation of Congress is essential to the success our new engagement, and 
I will consult with members of Congress at every step in making and implementing 
American foreign policy.273      
 The uncertainty about what to do in BiH also frustrated Congress. As the conflict in 
BiH deteriorated, calls were made for greater congressional involvement in decisions. 
Congress wanted to be given a chance to vote President Clinton’s proposed military 
commitment up or down.274 In April 1993, pressure mounted on Capital Hill to take 
immediate military action in BiH. Senator Joseph R. Biden, was leading a growing number of 
lawmakers calling for more forceful action. “The United States must lead the West in a 
decisive response to Serbian aggression,” Senator Biden said. 275  Senator Bob Dole, the 
Senate Minority Leader (from 1994 Majority Leader) argued: “All we’re doing is standing by 
while the Serbs mop up Bosnia and divide it into 11 little pieces and slaughter all the women 
and children. In my view that’s not a policy.”276 On May 18, 1993 Secretary Christopher 
proved there was a new moral ambivalence in the Clinton Administration’s policy. In a 
hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Christopher presented some 
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of the acts of atrocities committed by Bosnian Muslims against Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats by advocating: “There are atrocities on all sides in this terrible situation.”277 This 
testimony went against what had been said in Clinton’s presidential campaign and what 
Congress believed was policy. It became evident that it was not only the Bosnian Serbs who 
were wearing “black hats.”  
  The situation in Somalia in 1993 also concerned Congress. Congress’ reactions were 
intense and furious to the incidents in Mogadishu in October 1993, and more or less “tied” 
Clinton’s hands as Commander-in-Chief, except within the Americas.278  Congress held 
hearings to question the Administration’s approach in Somalia. UN Ambassador Albright 
testified that: “assertive multilateralism” served U.S. interests. Albright justified the use of 
military forces in Somalia for the purpose of “rebuilding Somali society and promoting 
democracy.”279  However, weakness in U.S. policy in Somalia had led to Congressional 
criticism of the Clinton Administration’s policy under the label of “assertive multilateralism.” 
Subsequently, the terms of PDD-25 indicate that the Clinton Administration had retreated 
from its earlier position of “assertive multilateralism.” An explanation of this shift in policy 
by President Clinton appears to have its basis in domestic politics arising from a self-
perpetuating cycle of confrontation and conciliation played out between the President and the 
Congress and on lessons learned in Somalia.280   
 The Congressional pressure on President Clinton over his Balkan policy increased. In 
February 1994, Bob Dole agued that a decision be the President to order air strikes would 
have “strong bipartisan support” in Congress. Also Senator Joseph Lieberman urged President 
Clinton to proceed with air strikes. 281  At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on February 24, 1994 Secretary Christopher emphasized that Congress would be 
fully consulted and its approval sought before American troops were sent to BiH. In the 
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summer of 1994 both houses in Congress demonstrated they were ready to lift the arms 
embargo unilaterally so the Bosnian Muslims forces could receive U.S. weapons. President 
Clinton’s message to Congress was that such policy would have grave consequences for the 
transatlantic cooperation between the United States and Europe.282 When the Republicans 
took control of Congress after the mid-term elections in 1994, the criticism of Clinton’s BiH 
policy not only resumed but became much sharper edged.283 What had been one of United 
State’s strengths in the Cold war, a bipartisan foreign policy, had reached its end. The 
Republican majority in Congress regarded BiH as an issue on which Clinton was politically 
vulnerable.284 Consequently, Congressional pressures designed to satisfy various agendas and 
Clinton’s weak appearance in Somalia and BiH, signified an opportunity for the Republican 
majority in Congress to influence President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions. With 
Republicans in full control of Congress, every deployment of force or UN issue was a 
struggle. The Republican Senate majority leader, a likely 1996 presidential candidate and a 
Bosnian activist intensified his criticism of President Clinton fecklessness and weakness in 
BiH. Dole wanted the U.S. to break with the UN and unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the 
Bosnian Muslims.285  In a television show Senator Dole said, “If President Clinton had been 
proving leadership the last 16 to 18 months, we wouldn’t be where we are today. We just give 
the Serbs everything they want and say we’ve had a victory.”286 James Baker, who served as 
Secretary of State under President Bush criticized Clinton’s position: “This is a slippery slope, 
in capital letters. This is exactly the kind of mission creep that led to disaster in Somalia. This 
is incrementalism at its worst, and a sure recipe for disaster.”287  Subsequently, Senate 
Majority Leader Dole and House Speaker Gingrich, on behalf of Congress were steadfastly 
refusing to fund American participation in multinational forces on the ground in BiH.  
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 On July 26, 1995, Congress challenged President Clinton to change the course in BiH 
by voting overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. When it 
later became clear that a peace agreement in BiH would require NATO to send troops to 
enforce the peace, Clinton thought it was not required to seek advance approval from 
Congress.288 Clinton’s argument was that it was pre-designed that U.S. troops participate in 
NATO missions. Congress didn’t share Clinton’s view. The Majority Leader in the Senate, 
Senator Bob Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich strongly hesitated to support the U.S. 
portion of the funding of a new multilateral force in BiH.289 Even if President Clinton 
maintained he had the Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to dispatch forces on 
his own, he was seeking a nonbinding resolution of support similar the resolution President 
Bush pushed through Congress before the war against Iraq in 1991. On the other hand the 
New York Times wrote in en editorial article on October 20, 1995: “The White House 
misreads the Constitution and public sentiment on Bosnia if it thinks President Clinton can 
order American troops into danger without a Congressional debate or vote.”290  Therefore, to 
win the needed Congressional support on his BiH policy, Clinton began inviting members of 
Congress to the White House and sending Christopher, Perry, Holbrooke and Shalikashvili to 
the Capitol Hill.291 Reaching out to Republicans was a pragmatic action, because the 
Administration needed their votes. On October 30, 1995 the House passed a resolution which 
expressed the overwhelming opposition; particularly among Republicans to the possible 
dispatch of American ground troops to BiH.292  House Speaker, Newt Gingrich called the vote 
“a referendum on this Administration’s incapability of convincing anyone to trust them.”293 
However, after several struggles between Congress and the President, Clinton finally got the 
support from Congress to deploy 20,000 troops for twelve months to BiH as a part of IFOR, 
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as he had requested.294 Without this support from Congress the Dayton peace accord would 
have been undermined.  
3.4 The electoral politics.  
The notion that the President should remain in touch with the public’s views on 
foreign-policy matters, such as deployment of forces to peripheral places, has not always been 
a conviction in U.S. politics. However, Vietnam changed that conviction as political and 
military leaders watched public opinion and the electorates turn against U.S. policy in South 
East Asia with tangible political consequences.295 BiH was an issue in transition from being a 
foreign policy, like Vietnam or the Iran hostage taking, to a domestic policy. The worse the 
atrocities and ethnic cleansing grew the more likely the television networks and newspapers 
were to report it, and the more likely it was that Clinton’s inaction in BiH would come up in 
press conferences and in his next presidential campaign. If President Clinton was viewed by 
the public and the electorate as either passive or politically impotent it could be devastating 
for his domestic agenda and his reelection.  Some Americans felt an emotional urge to punish 
the Bosnian Serbs with military force. However, to proceed without a strong national 
consensus and a clearer end state could prove catastrophic for all involved. In his statement at 
Senate Confirmation Hearing, Warren Christopher argued: 
Parishioners of statecraft …assume foreign policy is too complex for the 
public to be involved in its formation. That is costly conceit. From Vietnam to 
Iran-contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign 
policies hatched by the experts without proper candor or consultation with the 
public and their representatives in Congress.296 
Consequently, one of the six tests in the Weinberger Doctrine is the “reasonable 
assurance” of public and congressional support. Nigel Hamilton argued that after the end of 
the Cold War, most Americans felt more secure and paid less attention to international 
events.297 Geir Lundestad argues that the strongest restraint on U.S. power in the Balkans 
appeared to be the reluctance of the American people to remain truly involved in the affairs of 
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the outside world.298  President Clinton made extensive use of polls and focus groups in 
formulating his political agenda. However, Clinton argued in his memoirs “Polls…cannot 
dictate a decision that requires looking down the road and around the corner.”299 Among the 
considerations President Clinton emphasized was whether the American people were prepared 
and willing to support the sacrifices required to end the war in BiH, a war that presented no 
direct threat to U.S. security. According to an editorial article in the New York Times on May 
7, 1993 only a minority of Americans supported direct U.S. military involvement in BiH.300   
Appeals for public support became a routine part of Clinton’s presidency after the 
Democrats lost the midterm elections in 1994. Public and congressional support for the 
president’s policy comes only if Americans understand the issues and challenges the United 
States confront. In an television address to the American people on November 27, 1995 
President Clinton urged support for the dispatch of troops to BiH by saying “in this new era, 
there are still times when America, and America alone, can and should make the difference 
for peace…Let us never forget: a quarter of a million men, women and children have been 
shelled, shot and tortured to death.”301 In the autumn of 1995, public opinion was heavily 
opposed to U.S. force deployments; some 70 percent of the American public did not want 
troops in BiH under any circumstances.302 Consequently, there was no public pressure on 
Clinton to intervene with combat forces. The general American public, being quite unfamiliar 
with the Balkans and its history, exerted no or little pressure on the President or Congress 
either for or against engagement in BiH. Evidence suggests that a majority of the public 
opposed the use of ground forces. Consequently, the electoral politics should not be regarded 
as a power center on U.S. BiH policy as envisioned by Roger Hilsman. 
3.5 President Slobodan Milosević’s interests and objectives 
In the 1980s Serb nationalism raised itself as the most powerful political force in 
Yugoslavia. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosević, the most agile Yugoslav leader, saw his 
opportunity in the new-born Serb nationalism by ruthlessly and single mindedly exploiting the 
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anti-Kosovo-Albanian hatred of the Serbs.303 President Milosević was driven by an impulse 
for the creation of a Greater Serbia;304 subsequently he started the war in BiH because BiH 
had declared its independence from Yugoslavia.305 Richard Holbrooke argued Milosević 
possessed a tactical flexibility and superb negotiation skills.306 Consequently, Milosević 
matched his military actions to his political objectives, just like the North Vietnamese did 
during the Vietnam War. Milosević established Serb control of critical public institutions. By 
gaining control over the army and the state’ dominated media he could and did maximize any 
incident that would inflame Serb feelings.307 He was superb at using the media to sway 
popular opinion. Milosević’s desire was to hold power. Doder and Branson argued that 
Milosević’s history as Serbia’s ruler reveals a man whose only pleasure was controlling 
others. 308 In a memorandum to the EU foreign ministers, David Owen argued: 
The key as always is Milosević. He understands power and he will only pressurize the 
Bosnian Serbs further if the Contact Group convinces they are serious. He must 
receive a sharp reminder… and if he does not deliver, we will take further action 
against him. 309 
 Milosević had political objectives linked to vital interests; subsequently the Bosnian 
Serb leadership in Pale was one of his instruments to achieve the objective of a Greater 
Serbia.310  Radovan Karadzic was a convenient scapegoat for the price the Serb nation was 
paying for Milosević’s own misjudgments in BiH.311 As commander-in-chief of the JNA, he 
                                              
303 Holbrooke, To End a War, 26; and Doder and Branson, Milosević, 37-41. Slobodan Milosević began transforming himself 
as a nationalist in the fall of 1986 a few months after his appointment as head of the Serbian Communist Party. The Serbian 
academy of Science and Arts circulated a “Memorandum” published on September, 26, 1986. The Memorandum gave 
Milosević the idea that he could have a real base among the intellectuals for a nationalist assault on the Communist party’s 
leadership and the Kosovo Serbs could become an instrument to attain power.  
304 The creation of a Greater Serbia meant conquering territory of the former Yugoslavia where Serbs lived and the expulsion 
of all non-Serbs from Serbian land. The only way Milosević could create a Greater Serbia was through a military victory. 
However, once armed conflicts began, it turned out that a minority of Serbs were willing to fight for Milosević’s vision. See 
Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 150-51. 
305 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 169.  
306 Holbrooke, To End a War, 29. 
307 See quote in Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short Story, 252: “Having watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-92, I 
can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat from Ustasa hordes, fundamentalist 
jihads…It was as if all television in the USA had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan.” Control of the media was one of the 
most consistent elements of Milosević’s rule in Serbia. 
308 Doder and Branson, Milosević, 10; and Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia169-94. What 
distinguished Milosević from other political leaders in the Balkans was the brutal way he used the conccept of external 
threats to Serbia to tar political opponents with the brush of national treason. It should be noted that Mira Markovic, 
Slobodan Milosević's wife, played an important behind the-scenes role during Milosević's political career.  
309 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 287. 
310 See Halberstam, War in a time of Peace, 354-355. Milosević denied any relationship between himself and the Bosnian 
Serb leadership in Pale. According to Halberstam, CIA had evidence that nailed Milosević as the true Serbian leader. 
However, it was important for Milosević’s international image that he was not linked to General Ratko Miadić and Radovan 
Karadzić. Louis Sell has argued that Milosević's claim of noninvolvement in Bosnia was a lie. See Sell, Slobodan Milosević 
and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 160-62. 
311 See Sell, Slobodan Milosević and the destruction of Yugoslavia, 7. 
  
68
had control of the Serbian, Montenegrin and Bosnian Serb branches of that Yugoslavian Serb 
Army. He also had control over the intelligence and police forces, as well as the media and 
state finances.312 To meet his objectives, Milosević developed a dynamic to test the 
international community by testing a quick military probe to see the response from the 
international community, and if no resistance by force, then an even more brazen attack would 
follow. Milosević quickly learned what UN, EC, NATO and the U.S. was not going to do. 
Based on the lack of international military response on the shelling in Dubrovnik and Vukovar 
in Croatia, it was unlikely that military ground troops would be deployed to BiH.  
Consequently, Milosević exploited and magnified all the tensions in the international 
community and the Clinton Administration. It was that simple. However, Milosević seriously 
misjudged the international community. He was according to Doder and Branson totally 
convinced that the United States and the European powers were bluffing by threatening to 
impose economic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992.313 
  From a Serbian leadership position the chosen approach in BiH was successful from 
1992 until the summer of 1995. The UNPROFOR troops on the ground proved to be a perfect 
instrument for the Bosnian Serbs: First, the UN soldiers were lightly armed and consequently, 
were no threat to Serb interests, and secondly, they could be taken as hostages, thus reducing 
the potential of U.S. or NATO air attacks.314 Consequently, Milosević could get what he 
wanted without taking a risk that the international community would strike back with force.315 
Subsequently, Milosević’s objective was to get the economic sanctions lifted at no cost. 
Milosević also understood the U.S. strong reluctance to send ground forces to BiH, an 
understanding he capitalized on as he kept moving toward his goal of a Greater Serbia. The 
bottom line was that Slobodan Milosević had a strategy and the United States and the rest of 
the international community, did not. If it had not been for the genocide in Srebrenica in July 
1995, with the Serbs so brutally overplaying their “hand”, they might never have been called 
for their aggression. The genocide in Srebrenica was a strategic blunder that changed 
everything on the ground in BiH. In the end, Milosević responded to the only “language” he 
fully respected – the language of strength and force. The pressure from the Croat-Bosnian 
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offensive on the ground was not enough. However, when NATO’s sustained massive high-
technology bombing of Bosnian Serb targets was delivered with devastating results, Milosević 
accepted negotiations, survived and again demonstrated his talent for manipulation and 
political survival. At Dayton Milosević managed to convince the world that he had converted 
from “warmonger” to “peacemaker.”316 When the Dayton Accords were signed he proudly 
shared the stage with President Clinton and other international high officials.  
3.6 Deciding major factors 
Based on the preceding analysis in this chapter the following six factors may explain the 
U.S. approach in BiH:  
 The need to defend NATO’s credibility. NATO’s failure to stop the ethnic 
cleansing and violent war on its doorstep had a profound impact on U.S. leadership 
in NATO and America’s leadership position in Europe. Only by solving BiH could 
the alliance’s viability be assured. 
 The unwelcomed prospect of having to deploy 25,000 U.S. troops to rescue 
UNPROFOR troops in BiH. 
 The challenges from Congress who voted overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian Muslims.  
 The genocide of Srebrenica in July 1995 finally pushed the Clinton Administration 
over the brink.  
 The presidential election in 1996. The crisis in BiH had a potential to disrupt the 
upcoming presidential campaign. 
 The lack of action by the UN and the EC/EU.  
 
The confluence of these six factors, finally motivated President Clinton to decide to engage in 
BiH in the summer of 1995. The decision-making processes discussed in this chapter explain 
how the Endgame Strategy became the preferred policy for engagement.  
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4. Case no. 2: Explaining U.S. engagement in Kosovo  
In Kosovo we see parallels to World War II. The government of Serbia, like that of 
Nazi Germany, rose to power in part by getting people to look down on people of a 
given race and ethnicity and to believe they had no place in their country, and even no 
right to live. 
    --- President Bill Clinton317 
The story of why a U.S. - led NATO went to war over Kosovo raises at least two 
important questions. The author seeks to disclose (1) what factors moved U.S. policy from 
being distanced to the conflict in Kosovo to launch a U.S.-led NATO air campaign against 
Serbia on March 24, 1999; and (2) who were the dominant power centers shaping President 
Clinton’s different decisions on Kosovo. The objective of this chapter is to examine the key 
factors shaping U.S. policy toward Kosovo and the role that each of the five chosen power 
centres played.  
The Dayton Accords were viewed as a considerable foreign policy accomplishment for 
the first Clinton Administration. However, ethnic conflict in potentially the most explosive 
part of the former Yugoslavia; the province of Kosovo318  was not addressed at the Dayton 
conference.319 Neither had European leaders, who had assisted in putting out the flames of 
conflict in Slovenia, Croatia or BiH, paid much attention to the smouldering conflict in 
Kosovo.320 Subsequently, the frustrations among the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were 
growing over the U.S. and Western European forceful push to achieve a settlement in BiH 
without including Kosovo in the negotiations. For radical Kosovo Albanians, the lesson 
learned from BiH was that violence was a way to win concessions from the international 
community. On the other hand, the Serbian President Slobodan Milosević had accomplished 
what he wanted when the Kosovo issue was kept off the docket at Dayton.321 Halberstam has 
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argued that if Kosovo had been brought up during the Dayton negotiations there would have 
been no deal on BiH.322 Consequently, even if the Dayton Accords had ended the fighting in 
BiH, it had left unanswered complex challenges in Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians shared 
the same ambitions as the Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and Bosniaks who had left the 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia to form independent nations; they wanted independence. 
However, when Yugoslavia broke up Kosovo was a province of Serbia, not a republic. The 
international community had entered the Dayton negotiations favoring independence and 
retention of the former territorial and political boundaries for the former Yugoslavian 
republics, but not for provinces.323 Subsequently, the Dayton Accords gave nothing to the 
Kosovar Albanians. In the U.S., President Clinton won his second term and made significant 
changes in his National Security Team.324 William G. Hyland argued that the new national 
security team was a much more political team that that of Clinton’s first term.325 President 
Clinton choices were according to Hyland interpreted as a steadier need for implementation of 
his foreign policy and need for more support from Congress. On Capitol Hill, the Republicans 
retained control of both houses of Congress.  
4.1 U.S. diplomacy in Kosovo after the Dayton Accords 
In an effort to coordinate their policies and approaches to solve the Kosovo problems, 
the U.S. and the most powerful European nations re-established the Contact Group.326 Even if 
the Kosovo issue was first raised in the Contact Group in late 1997, the member states’ policy 
toward the conflict throughout 1998 was haphazard and marked by a tendency to avoid 
making difficult political decisions.327 The position of the Clinton Administration on Kosovo 
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was non-committal, as the NSC could not agree on who were the bad guys and what actions to 
take to stop the violence. Moreover, with the U.S. national elections coming in November 
1998 and the President embroiled in a growing sex scandal that had turned into a media circus 
since first reported in February 1998, the President’s guidance was typical of an ad hoc 
approach to problem solving, delay any decisive action, avoid commitment of U.S. military 
forces, and try to get the two conflicting parties to negotiate a settlement. UNSC Resolution 
1160 was to remain in effect until President Milosević initiated a substantive political 
dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians. In May 1998 the U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke 
arranged the first ever meeting between the Presidents Milosević and Rugova.328 However, 
this move by the U.S. only weakened Rugova’s crumbling political position in Kosovo.329 
Subsequently, the KLA challenged Rugova’s right to speak on behalf of the Kosovar Albanian 
people. In response to threats of NATO bombing presented by Holbrooke and continued 
international economic sanctions, in the Milosević-Rugova negotiations, Milosević accepted 
establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM).330  However the fighting 
and violence continued through the summer of 1998. Subsequently, on September 23, 1998 
the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 declaring that the situation in Kosovo threatened peace and 
stability in the region and that Milosević should follow a series of actions to stop the violence 
in Kosovo.331 Despite the tough demands from the UNSC, Serb security forces in Kosovo 
continued their offensive against the KLA and Kosovar Albanian civilians. Subsequently, on 
September 24, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the issuing of an activation 
warning for air strikes.332 Richard Holbrooke was again sent to Belgrade to demonstrate U.S. 
commitment and seek to narrow the gap dividing the two parties in Kosovo. On October 13, 
1998 the NAC approved activation orders that allowed SACEUR to begin NATO air strikes 
against Serb targets ninety-six hours after determining that Milosević had not complied with 
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NATO’s demands.333 Subsequently, the next day, Holbrooke reached an agreement with 
Milosević as Belgrade accepted 2,000 unarmed Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) observers in Kosovo, withdrawal of Serb security forces and free return for 
Kosovar Albanian refugees. 
However, the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement had its shortcomings. First, it excluded 
involvement by the KLA which had grown to become an influential political factor and the 
primary cause of the escalating violence in Kosovo. Secondly, the agreement lacked any 
means of enforcement if Milosević did not follow up with implementation. With ground 
forces ruled out, only airpower could back up the threats to persuade Milosević to actually 
implement the content of the UNSC Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203. Holbrooke noted: “The 
crisis is Kosovo, and there has been no change in the political issues that caused the tragedy, 
the rampaging and the pillaging this summer.”334 However, in late November 1998 all 
displaced persons inside Kosovo had returned home or had found temporary shelter 
elsewhere.335 Both parties in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovski Serbs would 
use the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement as an opportunity to prepare and renew the conflict 
the upcoming spring.336 Indeed, the KLA had an incentive to keep the conflict going and 
provoke the Serbs into violating the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement. A new Serb response 
with violence would force NATO to respond on what effectively was the Kosovar Albanian 
side of the conflict. The international community was not in a position to stop the KLA from 
exploiting the downsized presence of Serb security forces.337 The KLA demonstrated new 
actions provoking Serb forces into reacting. Subsequently, Milosević in November 1998 put 
into effect a plan – “Operation Horseshoe” to eradicate the KLA and establish a fundamental 
shift in Kosovo’s ethnic balance.338 Not surprisingly, therefore, violence soon emerged in 
Kosovo and attacks affecting civilians increased in number.339 In late December 1998, 
William Walker, the American diplomat in charge of the monitoring mission in Kosovo told 
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the New York Times; “both sides have gone looking for trouble and they have found it.”340 
When the year 1999 approached, the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement lay in tatters.  
As Srebrenica had moved the international community to take action in BiH, the 
massacre in the Kosovo village Racak on January 15, 1999 became a critical lever for those 
who advocated a military response against the Serbs.341 Consequently, in January 1999, the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Albright, in what became the final major diplomatic attempt at 
resolving the conflict with peace talks, invited the Serbian government and Kosvar Albanians 
to meet with representatives of the U.S. and key European countries at Rambouillet, France. 
Those talks started in on February 6, 1999 ended on March 18 without any agreement 
between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs.342 The failure of the Rambouillet negotiations 
left the U.S. with little choice but to follow through on its frequent threats of use of military 
force against Milosević. The road to war between a U.S. - led NATO and Serbia was settled, 
even if NATO was dealing with a part of the world beyond the scope of its Charter’s Article V 
security guarantees. On March 24, 1999, NATO unleashed an air campaign against FRY 
without a UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the attacks.343 The U.S. government, based 
on the reactions of Milosević to NATO bombing at the end of the war in BiH, and probably 
the consensus assumption of the West was that a few days of airstrikes was enough to 
convince Milosević to capitulate and accept the Rambouillet framework.344 Rather than 
capitulate, Slobodan Milosević escalated the conflict in an attempt to defeat the KLA and 
forcefully expel the Kosovar Albanians. At first, NATO only attacked Serb military targets in 
Kosovo. But NATO air attacks continued for 78 days, with increasingly important military 
and political targets being hit throughout Serbia. With the threat of a ground invasion of more 
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than 200,000 NATO troops and lack of any Russian support, Milosević finally gave up and 
requested peace negotiations, On June 10, 1999, the air-campaign ended.345 It was quickly 
followed by UNSC Resolution 1244 and occupation of Kosovo by NATO peace-keeping 
forces and UN government Administration.  
4.2 President Clinton’s views and interests in Kosovo  
President Clinton portrayed the Dayton Accords to the American people as a great 
triumph of U.S. diplomacy; an undertaking to turn BiH into a multicultural European 
society.346 In his memoirs Bill Clinton argued, “I was determined not to allow Kosovo to 
become another Bosnia.” 347 The situation in Kosovo seems to first have come into President 
Clinton’s attention in early February 1993, when Secretary Christopher repeated President 
Bush’s “Christmas warning” that the U.S. would be prepared to respond militarily if the Serbs 
escalated the conflict in Kosovo.348 However, the fact that Kosovo was a province not a 
republic in former Yugoslavia made it a far more sensitive issue than BiH, since the question 
of sovereignty was more legally challenging. Consequently, adding Kosovo to the Dayton 
negotiations would simply have been “a bridge too far.” President Clinton’s position was to 
rule out independence but support Kosovo’s autonomy within a Serbian state.349 
Independence posed two major challenges; first, it could destabilize the region, secondly it 
was feared that granting independence in Kosovo could set a precedent for BiH, where the 
Bosnian Serbs’ and Bosnian Croats’ claims for independence were at least as strong, as those 
of the Kosovar Albanians.350 However, the escalating violence in Kosovo in March 1998 
finally drew President Clinton’s attention back to Kosovo. As a response, President Clinton 
gave his first public comment on the situation in Kosovo on March 11, 1998: “We do not want 
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the Balkans to have more pictures like we’ve seen in the last few days so reminiscent of what 
Bosnia endured.”351 
Once again the United States reluctantly took the diplomatic and military lead in a 
violent conflict in the Balkans. However, President Clinton deflected President Rugova’s 
pleas for an enhanced U.S. presence in Kosovo. When the Serbs stepped up the use of force 
against civilian targets in Kosovo in the spring of 1998, President Clinton decided that the 
United States should threaten to abandon the Contact Group’s process because of its “least 
common denominator” approach and instead involve NATO in the ongoing confrontation 
with Serbia.352 The reason why Clinton wanted to involve NATO can be found in the obvious 
question that had risen during Clinton’s presidency: With no superpower enemy, why NATO? 
On the other hand, the Clinton Administration leadership became especially significant when 
it came to dealing with Russia. The U.S.-Russian channel established ultimately carried 
weight in solving the Kosovo conflict. However, to prevent a possible UNSC veto of NATO 
actions by Russia and China, Clinton maintained that it should be possible to threaten or use 
military force against Milosević without explicit UN authorization. Although, the absence of 
that UN authorization posed a problem for several NATO members as they contemplated 
approving the use of military force on a European neighbor. However, at U.S. urging, NATO 
started planning how to handle different scenarios based on possible outcomes of the 
diplomatic efforts against Milosević.353   
In June 1998, Clinton changed his initial policy when he decided that a diplomatic 
solution in Kosovo required the political participation of the KLA.354 However, Clinton made 
it clear that the U.S. still regarded President Rugova as the leader of the Kosovar Albanian 
opinion. Evidence suggests that President Clinton was eager to avoid any form of military 
commitment in Kosovo. Subsequently, he was unwilling to back his diplomatic efforts with 
U.S. ground forces.355  Clinton did not follow up the “Christmas warning” given to Milosević 
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first by the Bush Administration in December 1992 and repeated by Secretary Christopher in 
March 1993.356 Nigel Hamiliton argued that indecisiveness had always been Bill Clinton’s 
Achilles heel.357 On the other hand, Niall Fergususon advocated that “it is well known that the 
Clinton Administration’s attitude was determined, as usual, by the fear of American 
casualties.”358 
There were at least four reasons why President Clinton did not push the issue of 
threatening with the use of military force: First, late 1998 and early 1999 was not a 
convenient time for President Clinton to push another military intervention in the Balkans 
even if the violence in Kosovo escalated. An effective foreign policy requires that the 
President lead with confidence, however, preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky scandal, 
Clinton found it challenging to personally offer the leadership necessary for a decisive 
diplomatic and military action in Kosovo.359 As the Monica Lewinsky scandal unfolded and 
impeachment became a possibility, the “last thing” President Clinton needed was a new fight 
with Congress and Pentagon over a conflict in the Balkans.360 Secondly, Clinton had a belief 
that any threat of military action against Milosević had to involve the NATO allies; he was 
unwilling to follow a unilateral approach.361 Third, Clinton seems to have been convinced that 
Congress and the public would reject U.S. ground forces in Kosovo.362 Fourth, Clinton was 
concerned about launching any new military action that may risk a repeat of the experience in 
Somalia prior to the national midterm elections in November 1998.363 
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Evidence suggests that there was no “Clinton Doctrine” or a larger view of what 
President Clinton actually wanted to do in Kosovo. His politics in the Balkans after years of 
trouble were still characterized by an “ad-hoc” approach.364 Consequently, an overall and 
coherent U.S. strategy was missing. On September 30, 1998 the NSC Principals Committee 
met in the White House to discuss U.S. policy on Kosovo. Among the outcomes of this 
meeting was the recommendation to President Clinton to send Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade 
again and present NATO’s terms.365 Indeed, Holbrooke brought a new approach to the 
Kosovo conflict through the Holbrooke-Milosević agreement in October 1998. However, the 
violence on both sides in Kosovo continued. President Clinton admitted: “Bosnia taught us a 
lesson. In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we 
will have to oppose later, at greater cost.”366 Consequently, the events in Racak on January 15, 
1999 proved to be a turning point that pulled a reluctant President Clinton a step closer toward 
a second military confrontation in the Balkans. First, President Clinton signed a memorandum 
on January 21, 1999 approving a new U.S. strategy on how to handle the Kosovo crisis.367 
Secondly, he decided to try diplomacy one more time by revitalizing negotiations and 
increasing leverage over the two parties in Kosovo.368 Third, Clinton decided that the option 
of making Kosovo an international protectorate under UN Administration was acceptable.369  
The basic U.S. plan at the Rambouillet negotiations was to pressure the Kosovar 
Albanians into accepting the draft agreement developed by the U.S. Department of State, and 
then use the threat of NATO air strikes to compel Milosević to sign the agreement. Coercive 
diplomacy based only on weak threats is never a good idea. Subsequently, diplomacy was 
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hard to sell in the winter of 1999 as the two parties in Kosovo were “miles apart” and had 
little incentive to bridge the chasm that divided them. The answer to the legally problematic 
question of threatening and even using military force against the sovereign state of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), became more or less solved on January 28, 1999, when the 
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan met with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels.370 Kofi 
Annan implicitly provided his blessing to threatening use of force against the sovereign state 
of FRY even if such action was never explicitly authorized by the UNSC. On February 13, 
one week after the Rambouillet negotiations had started and the day after the Senate found 
President Clinton not guilty on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice; Clinton 
announced in a radio address that the U.S. would send nearly 4,000 troops to Kosovo as part 
of a 28,000 NATO-led peacekeeping force.371 “America has a national interest in achieving 
this peace,” President Clinton said.372 However, on March 18, 1999 the Rambouillet process 
came to its unsuccessful end: the Kosovar Albanians reluctantly signed the agreement and the 
Serbs refused.373 Subsequently, the stage for President Clinton’s second military intervention 
in the Balkans was set as he had little choice but follow through the U.S. threats of military 
force and commerce operations against FRY.  
Evidence suggests that until a few days before the air campaign began, Clinton had 
raised the Kosovo issue only sporadically in a few speeches, statements, and in a radio 
address. This is interesting because when an issue involves the possible use of military force, 
there is no substitute for the President to advocate the case frequently and forcefully to the 
Congress and American people. However, on March 22, Clinton stated: “Our objective in 
Kosovo remains clear: to stop the killing and achieve durable peace that restores Kosovars to 
self-government.”374 On March 24, 1999, the day NATO launched its bombing campaign, 
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President Clinton promised the American people in a television address from the White 
House, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”375 Why did President rule 
out a key military option? Clinton’s reasoning seemed to be threefold; (1) keep the fragile 
NATO consensus on the use of force intact; (2) avoid conflict with a hostile Congress; and (3) 
both Secretary Cohen and CJCS Shelton both wanted to avoid any commitment of U.S. 
ground forces.376 In his memoirs Bill Clinton advocated that the bombing campaign against 
the FRY over Kosovo had three objectives:377 (1) Show Milosević that the U.S. was serious; 
(2) deter an even bloodier offensive against civilians; and (3) seriously damage the Serbian 
military capacity. But his statement, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a 
war,” by ruling out the use of offensive ground forces, had the effect of supporting 
Milosević’s conviction that he could endure the bombing and hope to split the resolve of the 
alliance.  
4.3 Approaches of the President’s staff and advisors  
With the Dayton Accords quite successfully accomplished, evidence suggests that the 
second Clinton Administration no longer cared a great deal about the situation in the 
Balkans.378 American commitments to potential conflict in the Persian Gulf and Korea, where 
the “vital interests of the United States” took priority in U.S. foreign policy over the problems 
in the Balkans.379 In December 1995, Secretary Christopher told President Rugova that the 
U.S. would insist that Slobodan Milosević begin a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians to 
restore Kosovo’s autonomy.380 In 1996 the U.S. pushed Milosević to allow it to open a small 
American culture center in Pristina. However, when the UN High Representative in BiH, Carl 
Bildt in June 1996 suggested a coordinated U.S.-European push on Kosovo, the response from 
the Clinton Administration was deafening silence.381 For more than two years after Dayton the 
Clinton Administration essentially ignored Kosovo and their chosen champion in Kosovo, 
President Rugova. In January, 1998 the Contact Group members agreed at a meeting in 
Washington to set forth some principles for resolving the Kosovo conflict.382 However, there 
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was no serious U.S. diplomatic engagement in Kosovo until the situation on the ground began 
to heat up and violence returned in the early spring of 1998. Furthermore, the Clinton 
Administration conducted no formal policy review on Kosovo. One possible explanation for 
the low profile on the situation in Kosovo was that the Clinton Administration’s major effort 
in Balkan diplomacy was to keep peace in BiH, where a large commitment of U.S. military 
forces were leading the international peace-keeping force. The cooperation of Milosević was 
regarded as crucial to these efforts in BiH (as well as Macedonia and Croatia), a posture that 
reduced the Clinton Administration’s interests in pushing Milosević too hard on Kosovo.    
However, the conflict in Kosovo surfaced an internal rivalry between the Departments 
of State and Defense over planning and execution of foreign policy in the Balkans.383 On the 
one hand, Madeleine Albright as the new Secretary of State continued to be hawkish in her 
view on Slobodan Milosević and his intentions of establishing a “Greater Serbia.” Her 
position was that the international community had to stop Milosević’s plans for Kosovo 
immediately. On the other hand, Secretary Cohen and the CJCS, General Hugh Shelton were 
both “dovish” and cautious on the situation on Kosovo.384 The Department of Defense 
strongly opposed Albright’s many proposals to use military power to gain leverage over 
Milosević.385 Secretary of Defense Cohen and the CJCS General Shelton were unwilling to 
contemplate further military missions in the Balkans.386 According to General Wesley K. 
Clark, Secretary Cohen warned Richard Holbrooke that in his diplomatic work in Kosovo, he 
was to under no circumstances offer U.S. ground troops as peacekeepers.387 General Clark 
argued that this lack of interest for Kosovo was caused by the Pentagon’s commitment to the 
national military strategy, prioritizing the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.388 It also had to do 
with Cohen’s firm belief that Congress would not support the use of U.S. ground forces, partly 
from the lingering affect of the failed mission in Somalia and the new law that required a 
balanced federal budget.389 Subsequently, the Pentagon did not want to make any move that 
might engage American forces in more than a minimal way in the Balkans, especially crucial 
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was it to avoid ground forces.390 According to General Clark, Secretary Cohen became very 
upset when Clark introduced the challenges in Kosovo and the possibilities for future U.S. 
military involvement and the need for ground forces.391 Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
later recalled, “I was absolutely convinced that the United States could not afford to take any 
unilateral action, from a political viewpoint, and certainly we were not going to intervene 
unilaterally without NATO consensus and support.”392 In his book Waging Modern War, 
General Wesley Clark presents an example of the division between the Department of 
Defense and Department of State on Kosovo. When Clark presented a document on the 
challenges in Kosovo and his proposals for possible use of U.S.-NATO forces, addressed to 
the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense, he was instructed by the vice-CJCS General Joe 
Ralston; “We can’t deal with any more problems and the Secretary [Cohen] is concerned that 
Madeleine Albright might get a copy of this.”393 
Albright seemed to have had a personal loathing for Milosević after having dealt with 
BiH for three years.394 When the conflict in Kosovo escalated, Albright forcefully took the 
lead in devising an appropriate response. After massacres in February and March 1998,395 
Albright noted at a press briefing, “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian 
authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia.”396 She followed 
up with “by his actions in Kosovo, Slobodan has made it clear that he is spurning incentives 
that the United States and others have offered him in recent weeks – unfortunately the only 
thing he truly understands is decisive and firm action.”397 As the Kosovo issue again reached 
the senior members of the Clinton Administration, Albright became a far more central player 
than she had been during the handling of the conflict in BiH. Albright’s position was that the 
Clinton Administration could not allow the Serbs to define Kosovo as a purely internal 
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matter.398  In her view the way to stop Milosević was to use concrete measures that would 
expand the international community’s leverage over Belgrade. Based on the experiences and 
her perceptions from BiH, the only language Milosević would respond to was firm action.399 
Halberstam has argued that Albright “was absolutely certain of her beliefs about what needed 
to be done in Kosovo.”400 At her direction, the Department of State attempted to build 
international support for firm action against Serbia; using the Contact Group, which had been 
a successful approach to bring leverage over Milosević on BiH and get him to Dayton in 
1995. Albright’s goal was to ensure allied unity rather than division and to forge a roadmap 
that would keep the Russians on board.401  However, even with the previous agreement over 
BiH, the Contact Group was now divided as Russia defended Milosević approach in 
Kosovo.402 Consequently, Russia threatened to veto any UN resolution authorizing NATO’s 
use of military force. 403 The lack of common view and common approach among the six 
Contact Group members on Kosovo caused Albright to recommend to the NSC and President 
that the U.S. should take the diplomatic lead in Kosovo.404  Secretary Albright’s position at a 
Contact Group meeting in London on October 9, 1998 was that an agreement with Slobodan 
Milosević was possible only if NATO authorized the use of military force.405 On the other 
hand, Secretary of Defense Cohen made it clear before briefing Congress in early October 
1998 that he would not raise the question of U.S. ground forces.406 Subsequently, the question 
of ground forces was not reconsidered until after the Racak massacre in mid-January 1999. 
Well before the military operations against Serbia over Kosovo begin in the spring of 
1999, Albright gained the Clinton Administration’s support for a policy of trying to replace 
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Milosević. For two years. U.S. policy moved both behind the scenes and in the public toward 
that end state. In public remarks Secretary Albright repeatedly argued: “The United States 
wants Milosević out of power, out of Serbia, and in custody of the war crimes tribunal.”407 
The Department of State’s spokesman James Rubin argued publicly: “Milosević has been at 
the center for every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part 
of the problem – Milosević is the problem.”408 Evidence showed that among the NSC 
members no one else initially shared Albright’s certainty of events on the ground in Kosovo 
or what the U.S. policy in Kosovo should be. However, General Clark, the new SACEUR of 
NATO shared Albrights view.409 The views of the rest of the Administration were that the 
eventual use of United States’ instruments of power should be based on factors as the gravity 
of U.S. interests, the likelihood of success, the possibility for international support, the degree 
of domestic popular support, and the possible consequences of inaction – in other words, the 
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. As the majority among the principals in the Clinton 
Administration viewed the context; the situation in Kosovo did not meet these requirements. 
Especially, the national security advisor Sandy Berger was wary about threatening with 
military force.410 As late as January 15, 1999 Secretary Albright was the single NSC principal 
who pushed for more decisive steps against Milosević.411 The other principals were leery of 
getting involved militarily in yet another conflict in the Balkans, especially since there was no 
clear end state to such military involvement. Defense Secretary Cohen and CJCS General 
Shelton steadily held their positions: (1) the Pentagon did not want to support a second long 
term mission in the Balkans; (2) argued that the American public would not support the use of 
American forces in a civil war in Kosovo where the U.S. had no vital interests; and (3) 
doubted that Congress would provide the needed peacekeeping costs.412 The Pentagon 
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representatives were furthermore highly dubious that limited air strikes, as Albright had 
suggested, would gain results.413 However, when the principals learned about the massacre at 
Racak, the division on how to respond in Kosovo was lessened not just within the Clinton 
Administration but also among the European allies. Immediately after word of the Racak 
massacre reached Albright, she initiated the development of a new strategy, drawing on a 
proposal submitted by U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexandar Vershbow which went beyond 
the status quo policy endorsed by the majority of the principals on January 15th.414 The new 
“Albright strategy” discussed at the NSC Principals Committee on January 19th, consisted of 
an ultimatum to the warring parties in Kosovo to accept an interim settlement in which NATO 
would commit to enforcement of a political agreement with ground troops. Because no one of 
the other principals could promote a better alternative than Albright’s proposals, she finally 
gained the interagency support she had long sought. The next day the NSC staff prepared a 
memorandum for President Clinton’s approval, a document he signed on January 21, 1999.415 
The national security adviser, Sandy Berger was one of the very few original principals 
still operating in the Clinton Administration in its sixth and seventh year. Halberstam argued 
that Sandy Berger was both politically and emotionally closest to President Clinton among the 
principals in the Clinton Administrations.416 Berger was “dovish” and did not share Secretary 
Albright’s recommendations on using airpower to gain leverage over a crisis in the 
Balkans.417 Berger rejected Albright’s recommendations for some time, asking the General 
Powell question: “What will happen if airpower doesn’t work?”418 Halberstam stated that 
Berger’s position on Kosovo was, to delay any military involvement.419 Furthermore, Berger 
was sceptical about threatening military force for fear of having to follow through and 
implement the threats without having clear political objectives and a defined end state.   
General Wesley K. Clark, the Commander of the U.S. European Command and the 
Commander of NATO military forces, became a dominant figure in facing the conflict in 
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Kosovo. 420 Thus, General Clark would be the commanding officer in any NATO- led military 
operation against Serbia and Milosević.421 Like Albright, Clark believed that only force would 
work to obtain leverage over Milosević.422  In early 1998 Clark began to strongly advocate the 
use of force against the Serbs, at least the threat of air power.423 However, when General 
Clark warned the Pentagon that the escalating violence in Kosovo required a stronger 
diplomatic and military initiative in Kosovo, he was told that the Pentagon could not deal with 
more problems in the Balkans.424 Evidence showed that Clark pushed hard in devising 
military force to gain leverage over Milosević.  
One other key adviser to the President was Vice President Albert Gore, a man who was 
publicly intensely loyal to President Clinton and who kept a low key approach to 
accomplishing the role of governing, as assigned to him by both the U.S. Constitution and his 
boss. Al Gore was one of the original Clinton Administration survivors and a private adviser 
of conviction whose opinions were deeply respected by the President. Little has been 
documented concerning his role in U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years. But 
Halberstam argues that Al Gore was convincingly in favour of using military force to back 
diplomacy in settling the Kosovo issue.425   
4.4 Congress 
Many members of Congress still felt in 1998 and 1999 that President Clinton had 
misled them on the scope, cost and duration of the U.S. ground mission in BiH.426 
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Consequently, many of them were wary of being drawn into the same open-ended 
commitment in Kosovo. Prosecuting use of military force in consultation with Congress was a 
challenging issue for the Clinton Administration.427 However, Congressional support for the 
Administration’s initiatives would only come if Congress understood the issues and 
challenges the U.S. confronted in Kosovo. However, during the Kosovo process, the Clinton 
Administration only consulted sporadically with Congress before the U.S.-led NATO air 
campaign started on March 24, 1999.428 Although the Clinton Administration’s often 
professed position was to consult with members of Congress to secure their support, it never 
made a case of sending U.S. ground forces into hostile action over Kosovo. In fact, President 
Clinton on several occasions argued against such deployment.429  
In Congress, the Kosovo cause was initially kept alive by a small group of congressmen 
led by Representative Elliot L. Engel (Democrat – N.Y.). On July 29, 1996 Engel sponsored a 
resolution in the House (H. Con. Res. 155) urging President Clinton to appoint a special 
envoy to Kosovo.430 After Representative Engel’s initiative in the summer of 1996, evidence 
showed that the situation in Kosovo was hardly discussed in Congress before violence broke 
out in March 1998. On March 6, 1998 Senator Joseph R. Biden called for immediate action in 
Kosovo by arguing: “The violence in Kosovo could provide the spark to ignite the Balkan 
tinderbox into full-scale regional war, which, in the worst case, could bring in neighboring 
Albania, Macedonia - and perhaps even Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.”431 In the following 
weeks human rights violations in Kosovo were discussed in Congress; making calls for an end 
to the violent repression of Kosovar Albanians and for the beginning of a dialogue between 
the Serb authorities and the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians.432 Examples of this are House 
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Concurrent Resolution 235 (1998) which took a strong stand to resolve the situation in 
Kosovo and Senate Concurrent Resolution 85 (1998) which condemned the Serbian 
government for gross human rights violations.  
In the late summer of 1998, after the Clinton Administration and NATO warned again 
of impending military action against Milosević, several Republican Senators criticized the 
Administration’s approach toward ending the Kosovo conflict. Senator Don Nickles was not 
impressed with President Clinton’s plan and argued on the Senate floor: “They have a lot of 
work to do if they’re going to convince the Congress.”433 Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advocated, “This is an extremely complex issue, but 
it is clear that the planning on the part of the Administration is inadequate.”434 Several other 
critical Republican senators expressed support for air strikes against the Serbs to end the 
killings in Kosovo.435 Senator John W. Warner, the Republican chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee was one of few prominent Republicans who voiced support to President 
Clinton’s February 13, 1999 decision to deploy 4,000 U.S. soldiers as part of a planned 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR).436  However, President Clinton’s decision to 
deploy peacekeeping troops, if the Rambouillet negotiations were successful, became a 
torturous experience for his Administration. The larger problem the Clinton Administration 
faced was that Congress did not value an additional U.S. peacekeeping force in the Balkans. 
Members of the House and Senate from both parties were critical of the Administration’s 
course, caused by their skepticism about international cooperation in general and a desire to 
maintain maximum freedom of action for the U.S. in its foreign policy. Subsequently, 
members of Congress from both parties were openly suspicious about U.S. force deployments 
to Kosovo. Some members said they feared the mission “was so flawed that it could turn into 
a nightmare similar to the Vietnam War.”437 The bipartisan doubts were reflected in support 
for another House resolution against sending U.S. troops to Kosovo proposed by 
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Representative Tillie K. Fowler.438 However, on March 11, 1999 the House of 
Representatives voted 219-191 to support President Clinton’s plan to send the 4,000 U.S. 
troops should a peace settlement be reached at Rambouillet after a long and passionate debate 
on United States policy in the Balkans.439 The opponents argued that Kosovo would prove to 
be a quagmire and that Europe should police any settlement itself. Sentiment in the Congress 
toward Kosovo, just as it had been in BiH, tended to be similar to that of many in the 
Pentagon – “We don’t have a dog in that fight.” 
In March 1999, Senators again clashed over United States’ role in an eventual NATO 
air campaign if Milosević refused to sign the peace accord negotiated at Rambouillet. Again, 
Republicans complained that the Administration had not sought Congressional approval for 
U.S. participation in an air campaign against Serbia.440 Democrats urged the Senate to 
postpone a vote on this issue. Senator Joseph R. Biden supported the Administration by 
focusing on the moral obligation the United States had to end the fighting as well as the 
impact this had on national security. Biden argued, “It’s about genocide and ethnic 
cleansing.”441 However, on March 23, 1999 with a bipartisan majority of 58-41, the Senate 
voted to support the air campaign against Serbia. Lee H. Hamilton advocated that Congress 
during the Kosovo crisis acted in a variety of confusing ways that complicated things for the 
Clinton Administration.442 However, significant financial costs were also a consideration for 
Congress which was under the restraints of the Balanced Budget Amendment. A big military 
undertaking in Kosovo would demand huge funds for years to come; a fact the Congress had 
to consider. President Clinton had to lobby hard to get a positive vote in Congress. Just after 
the NATO bombings started over Kosovo in March 1999, no fewer than 41 senators voted in 
favour of a motion that condemned the use of military force against FRY.  
4.5 The electoral politics  
It is difficult for a U.S. Administration to generate public support for military 
operations in conflicts that few citizens have yet heard about. Most Americans probably had 
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no idea where Kosovo was located and certainly very few were even aware of who were the 
belligerents or what were the cultural-political causes for the conflict. Subsequently, an 
underlying challenge in the Clinton Administration’s Kosovo policy was its presumption that 
the American people would not support a more decisive approach dealing with the violence in 
Kosovo. The failed raid in Somalia in October 1992, in which eighteen U.S. soldiers were 
killed, was probably most significant in shaping the electorate’s attitude toward a new peace-
keeping intervention. In 1998, and until his 1999 acquittal in the Impeachment trial, President 
Clinton was essentially politically paralyzed by “Monicagate.” The last thing the Clinton 
Administration wanted was a military disaster fresh in the minds of voters before the 
November 1998 elections; so the approach was to delay decisive action until after the 
elections. Thus to a large extent, an uninformed public was not a major factor or power center 
in the Kosovo crisis, but the perception of Secretary Cohen that he could not garner public 
support for the use of ground forces in the conflict certainly limited the policy options.  
4.6 The Yugoslav President Milosević’s interests and objectives  
Slobodan Milosević regarded the Dayton Accords as something of a victory. He, “the 
arsonist,” had been enlisted to extinguish the fires that he himself had created in BiH. 
Subsequently, Milosević sold Dayton to the Serb nation as a personal diplomatic triumph.443 
During the negotiations in Dayton, Milosević had behaved as “Slobodan the Good,” trying to 
convince the international community that he had converted from warmonger to 
peacemaker.444 However, few were persuaded by the “gentler” Milosević, because the “bad” 
Milosević kept breaking through. The international community’s responses after the peace 
settlement in BiH showed no eager pursuit of the indicted war criminals Radavan Karadzic or 
General Ratko Mladić.445 Consequently, Milosević could quite rapidly assess the situation in 
the Balkans as “business as usual,” even if he felt the Clinton Administration had “double-
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crossed” him by continuing the sanctions against the FRY.446 Evidence suggests that 
Milosević left the Dayton negotiations convinced that all sanctions against Serbia would be 
lifted.447 However, the continuing sanctions made Milosević less trustful of the international 
community, especially of the U.S., and less inclined to take objections on Kosovo from the 
international community into account.  
Milosević's political power was built on Kosovo. In 1987 Milosević had raised the 
stakes advocating: “Yugoslavia can not exist without Kosovo. Yugoslavia and Serbia will not 
give up Kosovo.”448 Evidence suggests that Milosević regarded the conflict in Kosovo as 
strictly a domestic matter. His view on the conflict was that FRY were under attack from the 
“terrorist organization” KLA. Consequently, he had every right to eliminate the “terrorists” 
and outright reject any suggestion from the international community for possible autonomy 
for the Kosovar Albanians. Further, Milosević could not politically afford to give up Kosovo 
voluntarily, even if he had wanted to do so. Louis Sell argued that depsite the political 
importance Kosovo had for Milosević, there is little proof that he cared much for the province 
and its inhabitans.449 When NATO threatened to use airpower against targets in Serbia and 
Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, Milosević was unconvinced that NATO would move beyond 
its warnings. Milosević's position was that he could outlast NATO with a duel of wills and 
that NATO would not attack in an out of area operation without a UNSC resolution, a 
resolution Russia would veto.450 If, however NATO attacked, his strategy was quite 
promising; hunker down, tolerate the airstrikes, and wait for Russian pressure or NATO 
internal dissension to weaken the alliance's resolve.451 President Clinton's insistence that 
ground forces were not on the table only made Milosević more optimistic.  
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On the other hand, Milosević understood the serious personal confrontation he had with 
Secretary Albright and her influence in the Clinton Administration. Subsequently, the Serbian 
media controlled by Milosević accused Albright for being a “Serb hater.“452 Evidence shows 
that Milosević had a split view of America. On the one hand he tended to advocate that 
America was one-sidely critiucal of the Serbs. His propaganda machine drew parallels 
between the U.S. and Nazi Germany.453 On the other hand Milosević was also facinated by the 
United States' position as the sole global superpower. Consequently, Milosević seemed to 
prefer to deal with the U.S. rather than European nations. However, Kosovo became the field 
of Milosević's greatest political struggle and another serious catastrophe for Serbia. 
Milosević's lack of foreign experience and his disregard of information and advice given by 
his advisors led him to ignore the changes around him.454 One of the changes Milosević failed 
to fully detect was the change underway in Russia.455 Certainly, Moscow's historical, cultural, 
ethnical, and religious links to the Serbs were strong, but with the Soviet Union gone, and 
Russia dependent on the West for financial support, Russia had no leverage to stop the NATO 
bombardments of Serbia in 1999. It can be argued that Milosević became a partial victim of 
the dynamic he himself had created over Kosovo. Milosević had enjoyed some flexibility 
when it came to BiH; he had none in Kosovo. With so many strong emotions in most Serbs 
over Kosovo, giving it up would without struggle would have been political suicide. There has 
been speculations about why Milosević rejected the Rambouillet negotiations when this 
brought him into conflict with NATO. Richard Holbrooke has suggested four possible 
reasons:456 (1) Milosević had paid close attention to Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 
December 1998, and thought he could survive something similar;457 (2) Milosević may have 
seen the list of bombing targets and realized it was light;458 (3) Milosević believed he could 
outlast NATO in a duel of wills. This because he was well aware of the political divisions 
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within NATO;459 and (4) the drafted Annex B at Rambouillet would allow NATO personnel, 
aircraft and vehicles an unimpeded access to FRY territory, a demand Milosević would not 
accept.460 When the war started on March 24, 1999 Milosević proved that consensus among 
NATO members saying that he would give in after a few days of bombing, was wrong. 
However, the most significant response by Milosević to NATO's threats of bombing was his 
escalation of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo the days before the NATO bombing started on March 
24, 1999.461 In the end Kosovo's significance to Milosević's political survival made him 
prepared to fight against the most powerful military alliance – NATO, a fight neither Serbia 
nor he could win. However, the ethnic cleansing initiated in March 1999 must stand as 
Milosević's greatest strategic blunder. It fully engaged the Western opinions and built a strong 
motivation among the NATO member states.  
4.7 Deciding factors to attack Serbia over its Kosovo policies 
Overwhelming evidence suggests that the conflict in Kosovo did not occupy a central 
place in the second Clinton Administration’s national security policy until the early spring of 
1999. However, gradually and unwilling it was drawn into this violent conflict. In the Kosovo 
conflict, the shadows of Somalia and Vietnam were still present; the possibility for the U.S. to 
be involved in a domestic conflict with no end and no vital interests. Therefore, U.S. policy on 
Kosovo was, as it had been in BiH, lurching from one problem to the next until the policy 
became outpaced by escalation of violence on the ground in Kosovo.  
Policy clarity influences the most serious developments of war and peace. However, 
evidence suggests that Washington had no holistic plan, clear strategy, or political objectives 
for Kosovo. Subsequently, the Clinton Administration sent mixed messages: on the one hand 
it argued it did not support an independent Kosovo and on the other hand it was preventing 
Serbia from exercising its sovereign rights in Kosovo. Another limitation was President 
Clinton’s evident reluctance to lead; his mind seemed to be focused on the impeachment trial 
he was facing. It also appears that the Clinton Administration overestimated the degree of 
Congressional opposition to a well-argued case for a military intervention in Kosovo. An 
underlying factor, derived from the inherent conflict of the Pentagon’s national military 
                                              
459 One example supporting this argument is what Milosević told the German Foreign Minister Joscka Fisher in March 1999: 
“I can stand death – lots of it – but you can’t”. Quoted in Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 94.  
460 See Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 87.  
461 This escalation of ethnic cleansing was made possible because the two-thousand OSCE observers were withdrawn from 
Kosovo in mid March 1999.  
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strategy and the need for Congressional support, was the lack of a unified American national 
strategy for dealing with Kosovo. Furthermore, the failure at the Rambouillet Conference 
included threats of use of force against FRY if it did not sign the proposed agreement. Once 
Milosević called their hand, the U.S. was committed. Following through to preserve 
credibility became a matter of vital interest. Given this basic situation, it was quite difficult to 
prevent war. Michael Ignatieff advocated: “Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo...was never 
exactly what it appeared. It was never just an attempt to prevent Milosevic from getting away 
with human rights abuses in Europe’s backyard. It was also a use of imperial power to support 
a self-determination claim by a national minority – a claim that used violence in order to 
secure international notice and attention.”462 
The policy context that finally moved U.S. policy toward the Kosovo conflict from 
reluctance to military engagement can be found in six prominent factors; which in sum made 
it “almost impossible” to continue President Clinton’s preference of coercive diplomacy. The 
role of the various explanatory factors can only be understood, the author argues, in 
combination with each other. However, the confluence these factors, finally motivated 
President Clinton to use air power against FRY from March 24 to June 10, 1999:   
 Coercive diplomacy against Milosević required a credible threat of force. However, 
the United States harmed its prospects for a successful diplomatic solution by 
threatening an amount and type of military force that carried little weight in the mind 
of Slobodan Milosević. Following through to preserve credibility became a matter of 
vital interest for the United States, a credibility that was of ultimate value to the U.S. 
in its global leadership role and to enhance the viability of the NATO alliance after the 
end of the Cold War.   
 The alternative of standing by and observing what Milosević assumingly would do 
with the Kosovar Albanians was simply unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective, 
especially in light of the atrocities previously committed by Serbian and Montenegrin 
military and para-military forces in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo. 
 The killing in Racak on January 15, 1999 mobilized popular opinion and was the event 
that finally pushed the Clinton Administration “over the brink.”  
 Milosević’s personal arrogance and unwillingness to compromise were certainly key 
factors. But his biggest mistake was his lack of realization that he actually would face 
severe military actions as long as he did not make any concessions.   
                                              
462 See Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, (London: Chatto & Windus, 
2003), 70.  
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 The United States overestimated its dependence on Slobodan Milosević to secure the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords. Consequently, the Clinton Administration lost 
some of its leverage over Milosević on an issue unrelated to BiH – Kosovo. 
 The personal conviction and convincing influence of Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, coupled 
with the extraordinary diplomatic expertise of Richard Holbrooke cannot be 
underestimated. These three key individuals were key to persuading President Clinton 
to first enter diplomatic negotiations, threaten the use of force, and then to actually use 
it to stop the violence in Kosovo. 
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5. Conclusion  
The conclusion of this thesis suggests that the Clinton Administrations’ followed an ad-
hoc approach in their Balkans foreign policy. There is little evidence that either of the Clinton 
Administrations followed a coherent policy approach in the Balkans. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that what the Clinton Administrations lacked, their opponent, Slobodan Milosević 
possessed – a clear vision, political objectives, a strategy, courage and willingness to use 
available instruments of power. Consequently, the United States’ contribution to the efforts of 
the international community to obtain peace in BiH and Kosovo took much longer than it 
might have if there had been a coherent foreign policy that stayed the course over the years.  
Evidence presented in the previous chapters also suggests that the decisions of 
President Bill Clinton to respond militarily in BiH and Kosovo were a confluence of several 
factors.463 However, a closer reading of the Clinton Administrations’ policy processes in the 
Balkans yields a clear impression that very few of these factors were of primary importance.  
Consequently, the conclusion of this thesis suggests that Clinton primarily became motivated 
in the Balkans by two significant factors: 
1. The prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high 
political risks and costs to President Clinton.  
2. The genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 and the killings in Racak on January 
15, 1999 forced the U.S. to take a proactive leadership role toward finding a 
peaceful settlement. 
The analyses and the conclusion of this thesis demonstrates that using Hilsman Political 
Process Model was a useful approach to identify the significant motivating factors and the 
impact that each power center had on President Clinton’s decision-making processes in the 
Balkans.  
After this brief introduction, my final chapter identifies and elaborates on the two 
significant factors that motivated President Clinton to respond militarily in the two cases 
examined. This is followed by a suggested verdict on President Clinton’s foreign policy 
leadership on the BiH and Kosovo crises. Finally, the dominant power centres, as espoused by 
Roger Hilsman are examined.  
                                              
463 For an elaboration on identified factors, see subchapters 3.6 and 4.7 in this thesis. 
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5.1 Significant motivating factors  
As presented in this Chapter’s introduction, evidence suggests two central arguments 
which had significant impact in motivating President Clinton to respond militarily in BiH and 
Serbia. The single most influential motivation factor was Clinton’s realization that prolonged 
crises in BIH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high political risks for America and 
his Administrations. These risks had the potential to put Clinton’s prime political agenda in 
jeopardy, i.e., the U.S. economic well-being; and in the case of BiH, retaining his office for a 
second term. In the case of Kosovo, his focus was on attempting to restore his Presidential 
historical legacy in the face of public humiliation as a result of “Monicagate.” Furthermore, 
the preservation of America’s and NATO’s credibility became a matter of vital interest for the 
President Clinton. Evidence also suggests that the ethnic massacres in Srebrenica and in 
Racak became turning points for President Clinton’s involvement and decision-making 
processes towards interventions. These most influential motivating factors are elaborated in 
the successive subchapters.  
The other factors presented in the previous chapters were of secondary importance. 
This author does not believe, based on available evidence, that a principled concern for 
humanitarian crises drove the Clinton Administrations to the interventions in the Balkans. 
This is not to argue that his Administrations did not care about humanitarian crises, but it 
seems clear that this was not a primary factor in triggering intervention. Evidence suggests 
that far fewer people had been killed in Kosovo than the millions that had been slaughtered or 
forced out of their homelands in more violent civil crises in Sudan, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
– African nations in which President Clinton showed no interest in intervening.464 This lack of 
consideration for African crises underscores that President Clinton did not establish a 
principled concern for genocide and ethnic cleansing; instead evidence suggests he followed a 
case-by-case approach which seemingly favored Europe, due to vital American historical, 
cultural, and economic ties to Europe. In the Rwanda case, evidence suggests, that perceived 
domestic opposition to intervention from Congress, stoked by the U.S. Army casualties in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, helped convince President Clinton to avert his eyes from humankind’s 
greatest evil. 465  For these reasons, it can be argued that factors other than international 
humanitarian concerns were of greater concern in determining the Clinton Administrations’ 
                                              
464 See Michael Mandelbaum. “A Perfect Failure.” Foreign Affairs 78, no 5, 1999, 2-8.  
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policies. Consequently, evidence suggests, perhaps surprisingly to many readers, that 
humanitarian concerns and public opinion were of secondary importance to the President and 
his Administrations.  
 
The prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo were producing unacceptably high political 
risks and costs to President Clinton 
President Clinton was the first Chief Executive to fully understand and advocate the 
implications of the emerging global economy as a result of the information technologic 
revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of a bi-polar world. The evidence 
suggests that Clinton understood that U.S. economic opportunities in the Globalization Era 
would lead to a structural shift from nations to global markets. Subsequently, Clinton kept 
arguing “Foreign policy is domestic policy.”466 In part, because of Congressional opposition 
to the Clinton Administrations’ economic agenda, President Clinton had a firm view that 
closer ties to Europe were central to U.S. economic diplomacy and trade in order to secure 
America’s economic well-being.467 The EU emerged as America’s most important trade and 
investment partner. This economic relationship became highly and increasingly politicised in 
the 1990s.468  
However, diplomatically-demanded and threatened use-of-force deadlines came and 
went in both BiH and Kosovo without sustained, hard-hitting military force to stop the 
violence and fulfil U.S. political objectives. The longer President Clinton delayed his 
decisions, the greater he undermined America’s credibility. Consequently, evidence presented 
in this thesis suggests that the escalating crises in BiH and Kosovo and the credibility of the 
U.S. became inextricably linked. A slow realization in the Clinton Administrations surfaced 
and it was recognized that prolonged crises in BiH and Kosovo would have significant impact 
on the trans-Atlantic political and economic relations.469 The trans-Atlantic split over the 
                                                                                                                                             
465 See President Bill Clinton’s remarks delivered to genocide survivors, assistance workers and U.S. and Rwanda 
government officials at Kigali Airport in Rwanda. 25 March 1998. White House Press Release, March 25, 1998.   
466 Klein, The Natural, 78.  
467 It should be noted the U.S. and the EU are by far the biggest players in the global economic system. America and EU, 
acting both individually and together, play a leading role in the world’s economic governance. When acting in partnership, 
they control or steer globalization, at least within the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund.  
468 Clinton made the EU itself a central focus of U.S. diplomacy by establishing the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 
1995. To emphasize the importance of world trade to the economic security of the United States, President Clinton also 
added in his first term of office, an Economic Adviser to membership on the National Security Council. 
469 After years of mixed failed diplomatic and humanitarian approaches to stop the escalating violence, the reality  that 
something had to be done to defend its foreign policy record and United States’ credibility in the post Cold War era came to 
the forefront of issues within the first Clinton Administration. This was a seemingly slow realization in both  Clinton 
Administrations; evidenced by the fact that in 1993 and early 1994 the Clinton Administration seemed determined to get BiH 
out of the U.S. public eye and abdicated leadership to the UN and the EC/EU. However, when it became clear that the 
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conflicts in the Balkans produced unacceptable political risks and potential cost for the 
Clinton Administrations. First, a deteriorating trans-Atlantic relationship could put the 
centrepiece of Clinton’s domestic political agenda (getting control of burgeoning budget and 
balance-of-trade deficits) in jeopardy. Even if the U.S. and the EU had the most 
comprehensive two-way trade and investment relations, the two parties appeared to be 
engaged in a bloody competitive trade fight. Consequently, it was of great importance for 
President Clinton to substantially implement a policy of substance into the trans-Atlantic link; 
thus proving that America still had a fundamental interest in peace and stability in Europe. 
Such substance would affect the level of trade and investments and hence the American 
economy. However, Clinton’s reluctance to deploy forces to the Balkans raised questions 
about America’s interest in preserving its leadership position in Europe and NATO in the post 
Cold War era. Only by clearly proving that Europe’s security still was a matter of vital interest 
for the U.S. would America’s credibility in Europe and global leadership be preserved.  
Secondly, the future of NATO was naturally questioned after the demise of the Soviet 
Union.470 Evidence suggests that the regional conflicts in the Balkans undermined NATO’s 
credibility as guarantor of stability in Europe. Not only did NATO risk irrelevancy but the 
leadership position of the U.S. in NATO became threatened by Clinton’s reluctance to stop 
the ethnically-motivated conflict in BiH and Kosovo.471 Over time, the U.S. recognized that 
its leadership role in NATO was at risk and the President became aware that America had a 
vital interest in maintaining NATO’s relevance and maintaining its leadership role in NATO. 
It was largely through this role that U.S. gained leverage over its Allies in Europe, a leverage 
that secured American industry contracts worth billions of dollars. Consequently, President 
                                                                                                                                             
EC/EU and UN approaches were failing in BiH, there was no substitute for U.S. leadership and the need to prove U.S. 
interest in European security. This was especially true when the UN was humiliated in BiH where UN-designated “safe 
areas” supposedly protected by the UNPROFOR were overrun with tragic humanitarian consequences. Subsequently, the UN 
was thoroughly marginalized by the Clinton Administration and its NATO allies when the Kosovo crisis escalated in 1998. 
This approach by the Clinton Administration can be explained by two reasons: (1) the lingering distaste from not only what 
happened with UNPROFOR in BiH, but also the ineptness of the UN chain of command and tragic consequences of the U.S. 
pursuing enforcement of UNSC resolutions in Somalia, and (2) threat of Russian veto in the UNSC concerning taking 
military action against their Slav brothers in Serbia. 
470 During the Cold War, both sides of the Atlantic had powerful incentives to cooperate and avoid discord in the face of a 
Soviet threat. A serious transatlantic split in NATO would have long term strategic consequences. 
471 It should be noted that the European nations re-examined their own situation at the end of the Cold War and separately 
developed an enhanced common market, reduced political-legal personal and trade restrictions, and were rapidly moving 
toward a united Europe that seemed to Americans to be an attempt to compete economically and perhaps for political 
influence independent of NATO. The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht on November, 1 
1993, upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. The newly formed European Union 
developed a distinct European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the mid-1990s, including the establishment of armed 
forces directly under the command and control of the EU. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) was also founded and enhanced during the early 1990s, to include a primary political-military focus in its 
member states, which included most of the former Soviet bloc countries. 
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Clinton’s decisions to take the lead in responding to the crises in BiH and Kosovo can largely 
be explained by the Administrations slow realization that the prolonged conflicts were 
producing unacceptable political risks and economic costs that could not be resolved without 
firm U.S. leadership. 
By taking the lead in BiH and later in Kosovo, and in both cases using NATO as the 
selected instrument when diplomacy failed to gain leverage over Milosević, the U.S. 
reaffirmed its commitment to European stability and peace, secured NATO’s viability. 
Additionally, it preserved America’s credibility and leadership in the trans-Atlantic 
cooperation. These actions reaffirmed that the U.S. was a trustworthy partner for European 
security and business; a partnership which contributed to the growth of the American 
economy.  
The massacres in Srebrenica and in Racak 
A close reading of the Clinton Administrations’ diplomatic history in the Balkans 
yields the verdict that its policy towards BiH and Kosovo were decisive only twice. The first 
time was immediately after the Srebrenica, BiH genocide in July 1995 when news reached 
Washington D.C. The second time was when Serbian security forces killed forty-five civilian 
Kosovar Albanians in Racak, FRY on 15 January 1999. The evidence suggests that Srebrenica 
and Racak were turning points for the Clinton Administration. After these two massacres it 
became obvious that new policies were needed, policies that stressed decisive actions 
involving U.S. military forces. Consequently Srebrenica and Racak put in motion increased 
U.S. diplomatic and military activism against Milosević and the Serbs that resulted in U.S. 
military interventions. Furthermore, it is very likely that the affect that the adverse media 
coverage had on these two incidents produced a stimulus for decisive action by the always 
politically sensitive President Clinton.  
5.2 President Clinton’s leadership on foreign policy issues in the Balkans 
In the end, to understand what significant factors  motivated President Clinton to 
respond militarily in the Balkans, they appear to have been linked to his leadership style and 
his decision-making processes. The verdict on President Clinton’s foreign policy leadership in 
BiH and Kosovo seems quite clear: For years, Clinton followed a passive case-by case, ad-
hoc approach with a narrow conception of vital interests of the U.S. guiding his decisions. 
Furthermore, during that time he was hesitant, unfocused, and indecisive in his policy 
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responses. However, evidence suggests that it was the personal decisions of President Clinton, 
after months of reluctance in 1995 and in 1999 to finally commit the full force of U.S. 
diplomacy, backed by use of military force that was what made the differences in BiH and 
Kosovo. The fact that Clinton’s National Security teams were divided over which policy 
approach should be followed surely severely impacted upon Clinton’s decision-making. This 
fact probably contributed to Clinton’s indecisiveness in foreign issues. However, the lack of 
clear and consistent advice led to postponements of decisions that should have been made 
earlier to influence the course of events at less cost. It should also be noted that President 
Clinton was subject to powerful domestic constraints in which he had to lobby hard to obtain 
a positive vote; the Dayton Agreement would have been undermined if Congress had not 
supported the U.S. troop contribution to IFOR and Operation Allied Force could have been in 
jeopardy if Congress had condemned the air campaign. Consequently, President Bill Clinton 
should not be regarded as the dominant power center as envisioned by Roger Hilsman.  
 
5.3  The Dominant Power Centers 
Evidence suggests that the most influential power center during the conflicts in the 
Balkans was Slobodan Milosević. He had in most ways what his American and European 
opponents lacked: a clear vision of what he wanted to achieve, clear political objectives and 
the instruments needed to materialize his vision and objectives. He possessed tactical 
flexibility, courage, and superb manipulation and negotiation skills. Yet, Milosević lacked the 
morals professed by his Orthodox Christian faith; he was cruel and he showed little personal 
interest in the well-being of individuals. Although politically and diplomatically skilful, 
Slobodan Milosević was not good at using power for anything other than keeping it. For him 
nationalism seems just to have been a tool to gain personal political power.  
To meet his objectives, Milosević used dynamic approaches to test the international 
community. Milosević quickly learned when the UN, NATO, EC/EU and the U.S. were not 
able or willing to challenge him. Consequently, Milosević exploited those weaknesses and 
magnified the tensions to enhance his personal political power by appealing to the nationalism 
of his fellow Serbs. Milosević understood and exploited the splits in American politics and the 
strong American reluctance to deploy ground troops to the Balkans. However, in the end 
Milosević seriously misjudged the international community’s resolve, and especially the 
Clinton Administrations’ willingness to use force against him. He also overestimated the 
degree of support he would receive from his Russian ally. Milosević had a firm strategy for 
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BiH and Kosovo, while the U.S. did not such a strategy. Subsequently, Milosević over the 
years controlled the tempo and actions on the ground in BiH and Kosovo, while the 
international community was repeatedly outpaced by Milosević’s initiatives and momentum. 
Consequently, Milosević defines his position as the most influential power center as described 
by the Roger Hilsman Model, even though Serbia lost four wars and became a very poor 
nation under his leadership. 
  Madeleine Albright, to a certain degree, maintained a position as a power center 
throughout the Clinton Era which was enhanced when she moved from the external ring of 
Presidential advisers as U.S. Ambassador to the UN to the inner circle as Secretary of State. 
Although her role in the establishment of peace in BiH was limited, she did manage to keep 
the UN from being the dominant force in resolving that conflict and thereby embroiling U.S. 
and European ground forces in a major war in the Balkans. Whereas the UN played a large but 
somewhat inept role in attempting to resolve the initial violent break-up of the former 
Yugoslavia; it played a negligible role in the Kosovo crisis based upon the influence of 
Madam Secretary Albright. There is overwhelming evidence that Madeleine Albright, from 
the day she became a member of the National Security Council in the Clinton government, 
forcefully advocated for an appropriate response to stop the violence and ethnic cleansing in 
the Balkans. An appropriate response, in her view, included the use of military force. 
Consequently, it can be argued that Albright was the most hawkish member of the two Clinton 
Administrations. Because of her hawkish position, and perhaps because of her sex in a male-
dominated organization, she faced a great deal of resistance from other members of the 
National Security Council and especially from Pentagon representatives. As Secretary of 
State, she drove the U.S. policy in Kosovo by consistently arguing more interventionist 
policies to counter Milosević’s intentions and was often motivated by advocating a 
humanitarian justification. Evidence suggests that Albright desired to thwart the ethnic 
cleansing in BiH and Kosovo. Aside from arguing a strong response against the Serb 
leadership, she also took the lead in ensuring allied unity. Subsequently, she successfully 
managed during the Kosovo crisis to keep the Russians on board and NATO unified. When 
President Clinton was preoccupied with the Lewinsky Scandal, Albright demonstrated her 
leadership and developed a coherent plan that resulted in military intervention on March 24, 
1999. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that Secretary Albright was the “mother” of 
President Clinton’s Kosovo policy. She was also the dominant force who advocated the use of 
military force against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. For these reasons Albright, as a key member 
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in the Clinton Administrations, should be assessed as a power center in U.S. Balkan policies 
during Clinton’s Presidency.  
Evidence suggests that Congress was an influential actor on Clinton’s Balkan policies, 
especially because they were Republican-dominated during both crises and opposed the use of 
military force, opposed U.S. forces coming under UN command, and therefore could 
potentially threaten not to fund the operations. However, due to evidence presented in this 
thesis, Congress should not be assessed as a dominant power center as envisioned by Roger 
Hilsman. Furthermore, the American public was quite unfamiliar with the Balkans and its 
history. The majority of the American public opposed the deployment of ground forces to the 
Balkans. Subsequently, there was no influential pressure from the “electorate politics” on the 
Clinton Administrations to intervene with ground forces in either BiH or Kosovo.  For those 
reasons, “electoral politics” should neither be assessed as a power center in U.S. Balkan 
policies. 
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